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I.  Introduction 
 
The territorial scope of the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which has been in force since May 25, 2018,1 extends 
well beyond the European borders. In the past, European data protection law 
had already applied for companies which had an establishment in the 
European Union (EU). Now under the GDPR, the territorial scope has 
expanded through the introduction of a “marketplace rule” or “destination 
approach.”2 As a result, the new provisions of European data protection law 
also apply for the first time to companies worldwide which are not domiciled 
in the European Union, but offer goods or services to data subjects in the 
European Union or monitor their behavior. As this examination will show, 
the hurdles for the geographic applicability of the GDPR are by no means 
high. As a matter of fact, a great many companies outside of the EU have to 
comply with European data protection law. This affects not only large 
international corporate groups, but also small and medium-sized companies 
in particular.3 The new stipulations on the GDPR’s extraterritorial effect are 
therefore considered, not without reason, the most significant regulations 
therein.4  
Along with the new provisions on the territorial scope, it is also worth 
taking a closer look at the provisions of the GDPR on its material scope, 
which forms the second pillar of the applicability of the GDPR. In particular, 
the key concept of European data protection law, namely “personal data”, is 
interpreted much more broadly in a European context than under U.S. law. 
One example of this would be IP addresses which, according to a judgment 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), could fall under the scope of the 
 
 1. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. K 119/1. 
 2. Adèle Azzi, The Challenges Faced by the Extraterritorial Scope of the General Data 
Protection Regulation, 9 JIPITEC 126, 129 (2018); Paul de Hert & Michal Czerniawski, 
Expanding the European data protection scope beyond territory: Article 3 of the General 
Data Protection Regulation in its wider context, 5 IDPL 230, 231 (2015). 
 3. Craig McAllister, What about small businesses? The GDPR and its consequences 
for small, U.S.-based companies, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 187, 192 (2018). 
 4. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law – Its 
Theoretical Justification and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses, 50 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 53, 
71 (2014): “For any non-EU party, Article 3 is the single most important provision in the 
entire proposed Regulation […]”; Anna Zeiter, The New General Data Protection Regulation 
of the EU and its Impact on IT Companies in the U.S., 20 TTLF Working Paper 1, 9 (2014). 
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GDPR as personal data.5 In this regard as well, it can therefore be advisable 
for U.S. companies to examine the European legal situation. 
And even if the provisions of the GDPR are not directly applicable for 
U.S. companies, EU companies which exchange personal data with U.S. 
companies often have to obligate them contractually to maintain a data 
protection standard similar to that of the GDPR. This is especially the case 
if the data exchange falls under the category of “commissioned data 
processing” or “joint controllership” in the sense of the GDPR and/or the 
data transfer to the United States is to be secured by way of the standard 
contractual clauses of the European Commission. In its recent rulings on 
Facebook Fanpages and Fashion ID,6 the ECJ laid the foundation for a broad 
interpretation of the GDPR’s stipulations on joint controllership with regard 
to tracking services on the internet which is likely to have far-reaching 
consequences for the cookie and tracking industry. This also comes down to 
an indirect “export” of European data protection standards. 
It is therefore to be expected that the expansive effect of the stringent 
European data protection rules, which had been initiated previously by 
European Directive 95/46/EC7, 8 will continue to grow in the future.9 The 
intention of the European legislature here is clear. Companies outside of the 
EU which, like European companies, are economically active on the 
European market, are now also to be caught in the crosshairs of data 
 
 5. For more on this, see II.B.2. below. 
 6. ECJ Case C-210/16, Facebook Fanpages, 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, (available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=202543&text=&dir=&doclang=E
N&part=1&occ=first&mode=lst&pageIndex=0&cid=1442187); Case C-40/17, Fashion ID, 
2019 ECLI:EU:C:2019:629, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf; 
jsessionid=35B2D4A969007395F748FAA31C02C3DC?text=&docid=216555&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2128539); see also ECJ Case C-
25/17, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/ 
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=203822&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst
&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2129026). 
 7. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. L. 281/31 (hereinafter European Directive 
95/46/EC). 
 8. On the inclusion of the extraterritorial approach of Article 4 of Directive 95/46/EC 
in the data protection laws of other states, see Svantesson, supra note 4, at 89; restrictively, 
Kurt Wimmer, Free Expression and EU Privacy Regulation: Can the GDPR Reach U.S. 
Publishers? 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 547, 563 (2018). 
 9. See Merlin Gömann, The new territorial scope of EU data protection law: 
deconstructing a revolutionary achievement, 45 CML REV. 567, 568 (2017); critical: Dan 
Jerker B. Svantesson, European Union Claims of Jurisdiction over the Internet – an Analysis 
of Three Recent Key Developments, 9 JIPITEC 113 para. 28 (2018); critical from an 
international law perspective: Azzi, supra note 2, at 130; Wimmer, supra note 8, at 557. 
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protection law. In light of this expansion of the scope and, related to this, the 
definition of who is subject to European data protection law, more and more 
companies outside of the EU will also need to concern themselves with 
European data protection requirements in the future. This is particularly the 
case for companies in the US, since that is where such key digital economy 
players as Google, Facebook, YouTube and WhatsApp in fact come from. 
Impressive evidence of this was provided by the Google case, in which the 
French data protection authority CNIL imposed a fine of EUR 50 million on 
Google LLC at the beginning of 2019.10 This can also serve as a paradigm 
for a new era in the enforcement of European data protection rules. However, 
the applicability of the GDPR is by no means limited to the global players in 
the IT sector. Even the simple placement of tracking cookies on websites of 
U.S. companies which can be accessed by citizens in the EU can, under 
certain circumstances, lead to the applicability of the GDPR and as a result 
to an obligation to comply with the extremely lengthy list of requirements it 
imposes on so-called data controllers. In the event of a material breach of the 
requirements of the GDPR, European data protection supervisory authorities 
may issue remedial orders or impose administrative fines of (theoretically) 
up to EUR 20 million or 4% (for formal breaches: EUR 10 million or 2%) 
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, 
whichever is higher (see Article 83 GDPR). This could potentially compel 
U.S. companies to reexamine, and possibly change, their current structures 
and processes.11 However, it is still completely unclear whether, and if so 
how, the European supervisory authorities will actually enforce the 
requirements under the GDPR on companies outside of the EU. 
In the following, I will examine in what situations U.S. companies can 
be bound by the rules of the GDPR, with an overview of the specific duties 
they will need to fulfill where it does apply. First of all, the territorial and 
material scope of the GDPR will be outlined, with a particular focus on the 
new marketplace rule (Section II). This will be followed by a discussion of 
the fact that despite its direct applicability and binding effect in the Member 
States of the European Union, the GDPR does also grant the Member States 
a great deal of national leeway for enacting special data protection rules 
(Section III). I will then examine classic types and contents of data protection 
contracts which EU companies may be obligated to conclude under the 
GDPR if they exchange personal data with U.S. companies. This can lead to 
 
 10. See Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, The CNIL’s restricted 
committee imposes a financial penalty of 50 Million euros against GOOGLE LLC, 21 January 
2019, (available at https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-financial-
penal ty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc). 
 11. McAllister, supra note 3, at 201. 
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an indirect applicability of European data protection law provisions to U.S. 
companies in this regard (Section IV). Finally, I will describe the essential 
obligations that U.S. companies must meet should the GDPR be applicable 
to them (Section V). A conclusion will round off this article and give a 
perspective of possible future developments (Section VI). 
 
II.  Direct Applicability of the GDPR 
 
The GDPR applies for U.S. companies that fall within both its territorial 
and its material scope, as regulated in Articles 3 and 2, respectively.12 These 
provisions thus essentially “open the door” to the GDPR. The prerequisites 
for applicability are the subject of the following examination (see A. and B.). 
The GDPR applies without differentiation to any natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data (the 
“controller”),13 or which processes the personal data on behalf of a controller 
(the “processor”).14 In this connection it is important to note that the 
applicability of the GDPR cannot be set aside by way of choice of law 
clauses. 
 
A.  Territorial Scope  
 
In the context of Article 3 GDPR, three scenarios can be distinguished 
in which the territorial scope of the GDPR applies for U.S. companies.15 
 
 12. Article 3 GDPR: “1. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the 
context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, 
regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.  
2. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the 
Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing 
activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment 
of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of 
their behavior as far as their behavior takes place within the Union. (…).” 
Article 2 GDPR: “1. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or 
partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal 
data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.  
2. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (…) (c) by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.” 
 13. See Article 4 no. 7 GDPR. 
 14. Article 4 no. 8 GDPR. For more on the terms “controller” and “processor”, including 
the duties they have to perform under the GDPR, see IV. B. 
 15. On the territorial scope of the GDPR, see Manuel Klar, in DS-GVO/BDSG, Art. 3 
DS-GVO (Jürgen Kühling & Benedikt Buchner, 2nd ed. 2018). 
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Firstly, it applies for the processing of personal data insofar as this is carried 
out in the context of the activities of an establishment in the European Union 
(Case 1, see 1. below). Secondly, it applies to the processing of personal data 
of data subjects who are in the European Union where the processing 
activities are related to the offering of goods or services to data subjects in 
the European Union (Case 2, see 2. below). And thirdly, the territorial scope 
applies if the processing activities are related to the monitoring of the 
behavior of data subjects in the European Union (Case 3, see 3. below). The 
extraterritorial effects resulting from the expansion of the territorial scope 
under the GDPR are not to be underestimated and are worth examining more 
closely (see 4. below). 
 
1.  Case 1: Establishment in the European Union 
 
The GDPR applies in Case 1 if a U.S. company as a controller or 
processor processes personal data in the context of the activities of an 
establishment in the European Union (Article 3(1) GDPR). This applies 
regardless of whether the processing takes place in or outside of the 
European Union and what the nationality is of the person whose data are 
being processed. Thus, even a mere processing of the data of U.S. citizens 
would fall within the scope of the GDPR insofar as it takes place in the 
context of the activities of a U.S. company in the Union.16 This essentially 
corresponds to the legal situation under European Directive 95/46/EC, which 
was then replaced by the GDPR in May 2018. 
A central term in the context of Article 3(1) GDPR is “establishment”. 
An establishment implies the “effective and real” exercise of activity through 
“stable arrangements”.17 Whether or not such “stable arrangements” exist 
must be determined on the basis of the actual circumstances. In the view of 
the ECJ, it is necessary to take a “flexible definition” of the concept of 
“establishment” which rejects any formalistic interpretations.18 Thus, the 
legal form of the arrangements, whether simply a branch or a subsidiary with 
 
 16. Making reference to the associated European site disadvantage, see the study of the 
Directorate-General for internal Policies, (Direction A), Reforming the Data Protection 
Package, 49 (2012). 
 17. See recital 22 of the GDPR. 
 18. ECJ Case C-230/14, Weltimmo s.r.o. v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és 
Információszabadság Hatóság, 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:639, at para. 29, (available at http:// 
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=168944&pageIndex=0&doclang
=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1443262). See also de Hert & Czerniawski, 
supra note 2, at 233; Graça Canto Moniz, Finally: a coherent framework for the 
extraterritorial scope of EU data protection law – the end of the linguistic conundrum of 
Article 3(2) of the GDPR, 4 UNIO – EU LAW JOURNAL 105, 108 (2018). 
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a legal personality, is not the determining factor. Even internal departments 
such as production facilities, bookkeeping or data centers without capacity 
to conclude contracts can constitute an establishment.19 In particular, in the 
ECJ’s view, it is not of decisive importance whether the undertaking 
concerned is entered in the registers of the relevant location.20 Rather, what 
is required is a combination of the human and technical resources necessary 
to perform the activities of the arrangement,21 as well as a certain degree of 
stability.22 The provision of a space is not necessarily required, but a facility 
which is merely installed on a temporary basis does not meet the definition 
of stable arrangements. Thus, mobile business premises or trade fair stands 
which are not repeatedly set up do not comprise stable arrangements. If 
premises are maintained in the European Union on a permanent basis but no 
human activities of any kind are performed from them, in general this will 
likewise be insufficient for the assumption of an establishment.23 
Accordingly, purely technical service bases, servers or letterbox entities as 
 
 19. Similar with regard to even individual employees, European Data Protection Board, 
Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) – Version 2.1, 5 (2019). 
The European Data Protection Board is an institution of the European Union with legal 
personality (see Article 68(1) GDPR). The predecessor of the European Data Protection Board 
was the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. The European Data Protection Board’s 
task is to ensure the consistent application of the GDPR in the entire European Union. It is 
composed of the head of one supervisory authority of each Member State and of the European 
Data Protection Supervisor. 
 20. ECJ Case C-230/14, supra note 18, at para. 29. 
 21. See ECJ Case 168/84, Berkholz v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte-Altstadt, 1985 E.C.R. 
2251, at para. 18, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=93188 
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1444157). 
 22. On the legal situation under European Directive 95/46/EC see ECJ Case C-230/14, 
supra note 18, at para. 29; ECJ Case C-191/15, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. 
Amazon EU Sàrl, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:612, at para. 77, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/ 
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=182286&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst
&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1445005); see on the criterion of the permanence of an 
establishment also ECJ Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame Ltd and others, 1991 E.C.R. I-3905, at para. 20, (available at http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=96817&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&di
r=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1445492); GDPR European Data Protection Board, supra note 
19, at 6. 
 23. Similarly, on the freedom of establishment under Article 49 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) ECJ Case 168/84, supra note 21, at para. 18; 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law, WP 179, 11 
(2010). The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party was the European Commission’s 
independent advisory group on data protection issues until the GDPR entered into effect. It 
was replaced by the European Data Protection Board which declared many of the positions 
taken by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to be applicable under the GDPR as 
well. 
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such do not comprise stable arrangements.24 The same applies for websites 
which can be called up in the European Union.25 Persons such as business 
travelers or trade show participants who stay in the EU only temporarily are 
also not to be deemed to comprise stable arrangements, as a rule.26 However, 
in the view of the ECJ, under certain circumstances, the mere presence of a 
single representative in the European Union can be sufficient for 
applicability of the GDPR. This is the case if the representative is active in 
the Member State with a sufficient degree of stability, with the resources 
necessary for the rendering of the relevant specific services, and in particular 
carries out effective and real activities there.27 Naturally, this does not 
include the representative who might have to be designated by the U.S. 
company pursuant to Article 27 GDPR.28 
An additional requirement is an “effective and real” exercise of activity 
through stable arrangements, for which no stringent criteria is to be applied. 
Its existence must be ascertained on the basis of an overall view, taking into 
account the particular nature of the activities performed by the stable 
arrangements and the services in question.29 For example, in the past, the 
ECJ assumed a relevant exercise of activity in a case in which a controller 
had appointed a representative in a Member State who had negotiated with 
customers in that Member State on the settlement of unpaid receivables and 
maintained a bank account for the collection of receivables and a post office 
box for handing the day-to-day business in the sovereign territory of that 
Member State.30 On the other hand, if a U.S. company avails itself of the 
activities of a processor in the EU which merely processes the personal data 
for that company according to its instructions, in the view of the European 
Data Protection Board, that processor would not comprise an establishment 
of the U.S. company in the Union.31  
The data processing for the controller must occur “in the context of the 
activities” of the establishment, which depends decisively on the degree or 
 
 24. Klar, supra note 15, at para. 46. 
 25. ECJ Case C-191/15, supra note 22, at para. 76; European Data Protection Board, 
supra note 19, at 7; cf. also Moniz, supra note 18, at 108; in this regard, however, the 
applicability of the GDPR can derive from Article 3(2) GDPR. 
 26. See Klar, supra note 15, at para. 47. 
 27. See ECJ Case C-230/14, supra note 18, at para. 29, 30; European Data Protection 
Board, supra note 19, at 7; see also Gömann, supra note 9, at 575. 
 28. But Gömann presumably thinks that it does; Gömann, supra note 9, at 575. 
 29. See ECJ Case C-230/14, supra note 18, at para. 29; European Data Protection Board, 
supra note 19, at 6. 
 30. ECJ Case C-230/14, supra note 18, at para. 29. 
 31. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 12. 
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the extent to which it is involved in the activities in the context of which 
personal data are processed.32 The establishment must be integrated into the 
relevant data processing, and its activity must have a certain connection with 
it.33 For corporate groups this means that they must examine in detail which 
group company carries out what activities.34 The establishment must 
generally be affiliated with the controller to such an extent that the latter has 
a certain ability to influence the establishment. In the assessment of the ECJ, 
the requirement of data processing “in the context of the activities” can be 
met even by mere advertising or sales establishments.35 Accordingly, it 
found in its Google Spain decision with respect to search engine operators 
that the phrase “in the context of the activities” is not to be construed 
narrowly. A relevant participation by the establishment in the data 
processing does not necessarily require that the processing of personal data 
be carried out “by” the establishment concerned itself;36 rather, it is sufficient 
if the establishment is merely inextricably linked economically to the actual 
data processing.37 These prerequisites would be met if a search engine 
operator in a Member State forms a branch establishment or subsidiary solely 
to promote sales and sell advertising spaces with which the service offered 
by the search engine is to be made profitable, and these activities are directed 
at the inhabitants of that state.38 Under these circumstances, the activities of 
the controller and those of its establishment in the relevant Member State 
 
 32. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 23, at 14; see also European 
Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 6. 
 33. See European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 6. 
 34. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 23, at 14; European Data 
Protection Board, supra note 19, at 8. 
 35. ECJ Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 
(available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&page 
Index=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1449732); see also European 
Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 8; critical: Gömann, supra note 9, at 570; de Hert & 
Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 234. 
 36. ECJ Case C-131/12, supra note 35, at para. 52; ECJ Case C-230/14, supra note 18, 
at para. 35; ECJ Case C-191/15, supra note 22, at para. 78; see also European Data Protection 
Board, supra note 19, at 7; Gömann, supra note 9, at 572 et seq. 
 37. ECJ Case C-131/12, supra note 35, at para. 56; see also Moniz, supra note 18, at 
109. 
 38. ECJ Case C-131/12, supra note 35, at para. 50 et seq.; European Data Protection 
Board, supra note 19, at 8; a similar position had already been taken by Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search 
engines, WP 148, 10 (2008). It was determined that the national data protection law would be 
applicable if “a search engine provider establishes an office in a Member State (EEA) that is 
involved in the selling of targeted advertisements to the inhabitants of that state”. 
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would be deemed to be inextricably linked.39 The considerations set out in 
this judgment would most likely also be applicable to other website operators 
and comparable scenarios outside of the internet.40 As a consequence, data 
processing in the context of websites of U.S. companies would, in principle, 
also fall within the scope of European data protection law insofar as they 
avail themselves of a stable arrangement in the EU to promote their 
respective core business (e.g., through the sale of advertising and marketing). 
This is bound to be the case in more than a few scenarios, in which it is very 
likely that the applicability of the GDPR would also be triggered pursuant to 
Article 3(2) GDPR, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.  Case 2: Offer of Goods or Services in the European Union 
 
Additionally, the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data of 
data subjects who are in the Union, where the processing activities are related 
to the offering of goods or services to these persons, irrespective of whether 
a payment of the data subject is required (Article 3(2)(a) GDPR).41 Since the 
decisive factor in this scenario is that the European market is being 
addressed, this form of territorial applicability can also be referred to as the 
“marketplace rule”. 
With the requirement that the processing activity must be related to 
persons who “are in the Union”, the regulators made the GDPR’s 
applicability with regard to the respective data subject contingent upon a 
local connection to the territory of the EU. The GDPR does not provide any 
explanation of how the term “who are in the Union” is to be understood. In 
terms of time, it is in particular unclear whether a stay in the European Union 
needs to be on a permanent basis or can only be temporary. It should be 
sufficient in this regard if the data subject is residing in the European Union 
at the time of the (first) data processing activity in question.42 Article 3(2) 
GDPR pertains not only to European Union citizens within the meaning of 
Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) who are nationals of a 
Member State, but to all persons who are in the Union, regardless of their 
place of residence.43 Consequently, travelers residing outside of the EU, for 
example, will be subject to the provision in the same way as employees who 
 
 39. ECJ Case C-131/12, supra note 35, at para. 56; European Data Protection Board, 
supra note 19, at 8. 
 40. Also, according to the European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 8. 
 41. For more on the mechanism of the provision, see also Gömann, supra note 9, at 583 
et seq. 
 42. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 15. 
 43. Moniz, supra note 18, at 113. 
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are (temporarily) working in the Union.44 This follows for one thing from the 
meaning of the word “are”, which does not infer any element of permanence. 
For another thing, this derives from the fact that the regulators deliberately 
refrained from using the term “residing”, which had previously been in the 
GDPR drafts of the European Commission, the EU Parliament and the 
Council.45 Ultimately, this is consistent given the fact that recitals 2 and 14 
of the GDPR stipulate that natural persons are entitled to protection of their 
personal data whatever their nationality or place of residence. 
The term “offer” pertains in particular to where the controller or 
processor submits a declaration of intent to conclude a contract, as well as 
data processing which is carried out in the context of a mere request to submit 
an offer. Whether or not a contact is actually concluded is irrelevant. There 
is no mandatory requirement for any active involvement on the part of the 
controller or the processor. Even the merely passive availability of an offer 
on a website can therefore comprise an offer within the meaning of the 
provision. Otherwise, no serious demands are to be placed on the existence 
of an offer. This follows from the wording of the provision, under which the 
data processing merely needs to be “related to” the offering of goods or 
services. This covers not only data processing relating to the submission of 
an offer, but also data processing (of one and the same controller) which is 
simply pursuing the purpose of submitting an offer.46 Thus, the provision 
could also cover data processing which is carried out prior to or following 
an offer, in particular if it is carried out for advertising purposes, e.g. in 
connection with the ordering of advertising or informational material from 
the website of a hotel.  
The European Data Protection Board holds that if a company in the U.S. 
uses a processor from the U.S. or another non-EU/EEA country, then the 
processor should (in light of the regulations that are applicable for it) be 
subject to the GDPR if that controller is subject to the GDPR pursuant to 
Article 3(2) GDPR.47 However, the applicability of the GDPR would most 
likely not be triggered for a controller in the U.S. which, although it 
processes personal data of persons in the Union, has merely obtained them 
from another controller which, for its part, had collected and processed the 
data within the scope of an offer of goods or services to persons in the 
 
 44. See also Moniz, supra note 18, at 115. 
 45. See, e.g., European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
COM(2012) 11 final, 41. 
 46. Also according to the European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 17. 
 47. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 21. 
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Union.48 To that extent, the “chain” of responsibility (which can still be 
assumed to exist between a controller and a processor in the U.S.) is broken, 
and the transfer of data to the other controller in the U.S. (which is not subject 
to the GDPR) needs only be taken into account in the course of ascertaining 
the lawfulness of the transmission. Taking the view that the other controller 
in the U.S. would likewise be subject to the GDPR would lead to an 
unjustifiable difference in valuation compared to a controller in the U.S. 
which is subject to the GDPR pursuant to Article 3(1) GDPR and would like 
to transmit the relevant data to another controller in the US, as in that case, 
the other controller would not fall within the scope of the GDPR. Finally, as 
it is of no importance how frequently the controller or processor offers goods 
or services, data processing related to a one-time or first-time offer would 
also fall within the scope of the provision.  
The “services” to be offered in the sense of the provision are to be 
understood to mean any self-employed economic activity which is normally 
provided for remuneration.49 Under the GDPR it does not matter whether or 
not a payment by the data subject is required for the service, i.e. whether the 
service is rendered for remuneration or free of charge.50 It is likewise of no 
relevance where the service is rendered. Accordingly, it makes no difference 
whether the service offered is provided on the website itself (e.g., download 
portal, YouTube, Google Street View) or outside of the internet (e.g., in the 
form of a trip booked via an online travel agency). Services within the 
meaning of the GDPR are, for example, video streaming services, cloud 
offerings or social media, online press services or comparison portals. On 
the other hand, the website of a U.S. company which exists purely for 
presentational purposes is generally not a service within the meaning of the 
provision. As the European Data Protection Board made it clear, if a U.S. 
company delegates employees to the territory of the European Union, the 
data of these employees will not be processed within the scope of an offer of 
services within the meaning of Article 3(2) GDPR, but rather for the 
execution of the employment relationship.51 
 
 48. Dissenting, presumably, Philip Uecker, Extraterritorialer Anwendungsbereich der 
DS-GVO, 9 Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 67, 70 (2019). 
 49. See Article 4 No 1 of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, O.J. L 376/36 (2006). 
 50. This provision was included in the Regulation at the initiative of the European 
Parliament, c.f. Legislative Procedure 2012/0011/COD, EP opinion on 1st reading, Am. 20, 
P7_TA(2014)0212; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party had likewise argued for a 
similar formulation, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the 
data protection reform proposals, WP 191, 9 (2012). See also European Data Protection 
Board, supra note 19, at 16. 
 51. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 16. 
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“Goods” within the meaning of the GDPR are all movable tangible 
objects that can be valued in money and are capable, as such, for forming the 
subject of commercial transactions.52 The nature of the transaction 
involved53, or the question of whether the objects are of any non-economic 
value, in particular artistic, historical or ethical-moral, is irrelevant in this 
regard.54 Energy sources such as oil, gas or electricity are covered by the 
term “goods”, as are animals, waste, sound recording media and 
videocassettes. With regard to software, a good is presumed to exist if the 
associated performance is embodied in an object (e.g., DVDs, hard disks or 
USB stick). Intangible assets such as computer programs which are detached 
from material carriers do not comprise goods. Thus, even software which is 
available on the internet does not meet the definition of a good. However, it 
may fall under the category of a service.  
Additionally, it needs to be “apparent” that the U.S. company envisages 
offering goods or services.55 The importance of this prerequisite is not to be 
underestimated, since it provides an essential corrective against an excessive 
applicability of the GDPR. Whether or not something is apparently 
 
 52. See for example ECJ Case 7/68, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1968 E.C.R. 423, 
428, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=87685&pageIndex= 
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=989038); ECJ Case 1/77, Robert 
Bosch GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hildesheim, 1977 E.C.R. 1473 (1482). 
 53. ECJ Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-4431, at para. 26, 
(available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=97067&pageIndex=0&do 
clang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=991625); ECJ Case C-324/93, Queen v. 
Secretary of State for Home Department, 1995 E.C.R. I-563, at para. 20, (available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=99176&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=992637). 
 54. ECJ Case 7/68, supra note 52, at 428 et seq.; ECJ Case C-2/90, supra note 53, at 
para. 26; ECJ Case C-324/93, supra note 53, at para. 20. 
 55. See recital 23 of the GDPR: “In order to ensure that natural persons are not deprived 
of the protection to which they are entitled under this Regulation, the processing of personal 
data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or a processor not established in the 
Union should be subject to this Regulation where the processing activities are related to 
offering goods or services to such data subjects irrespective of whether connected to a 
payment. In order to determine whether such a controller or processor is offering goods or 
services to data subjects who are in the Union, it should be ascertained whether it is apparent 
that the controller or processor envisages offering services to data subjects in one or more 
Member States in the Union. Whereas the mere accessibility of the controller's, processor’s 
or an intermediary’s website in the Union, of an email address or of other contact details, or 
the use of a language generally used in the third country where the controller is established, 
is insufficient to ascertain such intention, factors such as the use of a language or a currency 
generally used in one or more Member States with the possibility of ordering goods and 
services in that other language, or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the Union, 
may make it apparent that the controller envisages offering goods or services to data subjects 
in the Union.” 
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envisaged must always be examined on a specific case-by-case basis.56 Only 
the intention of entering into such commercial relationships with persons in 
the European Union has to be apparently envisioned, but not the lack of an 
intention to do so. Therefore, it is generally not necessary to make a 
“disclaimer” to the effect that an offer is not directed at data subjects who 
are in the Union. However, it might be advisable to do so.57 If a disclaimer 
does in fact exist, for example through a statement by a U.S. company that 
goods will not be shipped to the EU (e.g., “no overseas shipping”), then the 
GDPR will clearly not be applicable, unless other circumstances indicate 
anything to the contrary. The mere accessibility of an English-language 
website of a U.S. company in the European Union or an e-mail address or 
other contact details is likewise insufficient to ascertain whether it is 
“apparent” that the offering of goods or services is “envisaged”.58 The 
restriction of the provision to an “apparent” intention is not to be ignored by 
any means, since otherwise a threat of excessive applicability of the GDPR 
to English-language websites would indeed exist. Nonetheless, this 
restriction is sometimes not sufficiently appreciated.59 On the other hand, a 
use of the English language or of a language or a currency generally used in 
one or more Member States with the possibility of ordering goods and 
services in that language, and/or mentioning customers or users who are in 
the Union, may make it apparent that the controller envisages offering goods 
or services to data subjects in the Union.60 An apparent intention exists in 
particular if services or goods are explicitly offered in one or more Member 
States which are designated by name or, for example, expenses are incurred 
for an internet referencing service to the operator of a search engine in order 
to facilitate access to the provider’s website for consumers domiciled in 
various Member States.61 Moreover, stating an international area code, using 
 
 56. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 18. 
 57. Accordingly, American publishers are already being advised to remove themselves 
from the scope of the GDPR in particular through disclaimers, but also through other 
measures; see Wimmer, supra note 8, at 575 et seq. 
 58. See European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 18; Wimmer, supra note 8, 
at 552; ambiguous: de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 239. 
 59. See de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 241, who do not sufficiently appreciate 
the restriction to an “apparent” intention and therefore criticize the provision in Article 3(2)(a) 
GDPR for its perceived broadness. 
 60. Azzi, supra note 2, at 129; Joseph J. Lazzarotti & Mary T. Costigan, Does the GDPR 
Apply to Your US-based Company, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 8, 2018), (available at https://www. 
natlawreview.com/article/does-gdpr-apply-to-your-us-based-company); Wimmer, supra note 
8, at 552 et seq. 
 61. ECJ Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter 
GmbH & Co. KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Oliver Heller, 2010 E.C.R. I-12527, at para. 
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a top-level domain specific to a Member State (e.g., “.uk”, “.fr”, or “.es”),62 
giving directions for travelling from one or more other Member States to the 
location of the establishment or reproducing customer ratings from the EU 
can all serve as criteria for the existence of an apparent intention.63 Another 
indication that the European Union is being targeted can be that a provider 
offers a special cost regulation for shipments to Member States of the EU.64 
 
3.  Case 3: Monitoring the Behavior of Data Subjects in the 
European Union 
 
Finally, the GDPR also covers data processing by U.S. companies 
established outside the EU which is related to the monitoring of the behavior 
of data subjects within the European Union as far as their behavior takes 
place within the European Union (see Article 3(2)(b) GDPR). 
Pursuant to recital 24 of the GDPR, these requirements are met where 
“natural persons are tracked on the internet including potential subsequent 
use of personal data processing techniques which consist of profiling a 
natural person, particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him 
or for analysing or predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviours and 
attitudes.”65 Consequently, both profiling and tracking in advance of a 
profiling fall under the GDPR.66 In the view of the European Data Protection 
Board, the controller must pursue precisely this specific purpose (i.e., 
 
81, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=83437& 
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=993409); European Data 
Protection Board, supra note 19, at 17. See Wimmer, supra note 8, at 553 et seq. 
 62. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 18. See also the previous version 
of recital 23 of the GDPR in the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), Version 56 
(29 November 2011), 20; additionally, Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1651 (2013). 
 63. See ECJ Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, supra note 61, at para. 83. 
 64. See Klar, supra note 15, at para. 84. 
 65. See recital 24 of the GDPR: “The processing of personal data of data subjects who 
are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union should also be 
subject to this Regulation when it is related to the monitoring of the behavior of such data 
subjects in so far as their behavior takes place within the Union. In order to determine whether 
a processing activity can be considered to monitor the behavior of data subjects, it should be 
ascertained whether natural persons are tracked on the internet including potential subsequent 
use of personal data processing techniques which consist of profiling a natural person, 
particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analyzing or predicting her 
or his personal preferences, behaviors and attitudes.” 
 66. McAllister, supra note 3, at 194. 
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tracking, profiling) with the collection and use of behavior-related data 
which is defined in recital 24.67 Accordingly, not every collection or analysis 
of personal data of persons in the Union which occurs online automatically 
represents a “monitoring”. Thus, for example, the mere setting of cookies by 
websites for purposes other than those defined in recital 24 does not fall 
under Article 3(2)(b) GDPR. According to the European Data Protection 
Board, Article 3(2)(b) GDPR covers in particular monitoring activities such 
as behavioral advertisement, geo-localization activities (in particular for 
marketing purposes), online-tracking through the use of cookies or other 
tracking techniques such as fingerprinting, personalized diet and health 
analytics online, CCTV, market surveys and other behavioral studies based 
on individual profiles and monitoring or regular reporting on an individual’s 
health status.68 
With recital 24 of the GDPR, the regulators make it clear that in contrast 
to what is being demanded by the European Parliament,69 the GDPR is 
explicitly aimed at internet content. Thus, events outside of the internet can 
in fact not be the subject of a monitoring within the meaning of Article 
3(2)(b) GDPR. This means that, for example, monitoring the behavior of 
data subjects by means of satellite photography, such as Google Earth, would 
most likely not fall under European data protection law.70 However, the 
European Data Protection Board obviously sees this differently and seeks to 
apply the GDPR to situations which take place outside of the internet as 
well.71 
The GDPR does not explain what specific cases are covered by Article 
3(2)(b) GDPR.72 However, it can in any case be derived from that provision 
that the monitoring must be set up for a specific period of time. One 
indication of this is the meaning of the word “monitoring”, which is 
characterized by a time component. For another thing, this follows from 
recital 24 of the GDPR, which explicitly mentions tracking and profiling 
measures, which can succeed only on the basis of continuous measures. 
 
 67. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 20; see also Wimmer, supra note 
8, at 557. 
 68. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 20. 
 69, See Legislative Procedure 2012/0011/COD, EP opinion on 1st reading, Am. 7, 
P7_TA(2014)0212. 
 70. However, if such photographs are subsequently made accessible on the internet, this 
form of data processing may well fall under the provision in Article 3(2)(a) GDPR. 
 71. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 19. 
 72. In view of the insufficient clarity as to which cases were to be covered by this rule, 
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party demanded a specification of the provision, see 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 9. 
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Additionally, the monitoring must have a certain intensity. Measures 
which are evidently designed from the outset to be one-time and specific 
actions may not comprise monitoring.73 On the other hand, the monitoring 
need not be tantamount to a comprehensive or systematic surveillance, or 
already make direct decisions which are detrimental to the privacy rights of 
the data subjects.74 In fact, the regulators consciously decided against the 
term “surveillance”.75 The same applies with regard to the French version of 
the GDPR, which uses the term “observation”, but not the word 
“surveillance”. Article 3(2)(b) GDPR also covers data processing activities 
that occur before specific decisions are made to the detriment of the privacy 
rights of the data subjects. This follows, from a systemic standpoint, from 
Article 27(2)(a) GDPR, which stipulates that for cases falling under 
Article 3(2) GDPR, no representative is to be appointed in the European 
Union if the data processing will not result in a risk to the rights and freedoms 
of the data subjects. 
It is sufficient if the data processing is objectively suitable for the 
purpose of the tracking or profiling. Accordingly, even a tracking measure 
which is carried out against the data subject for the first time and does not 
recur can lead to an application of Article 3(2)(b) GDPR. On the other hand, 
the provision does not apply if, for example, the data processing merely 
serves to deny insecure browsers access to a website.76 
Since suitability is the decisive factor, the motivation of the controller 
or processor is of no relevance. Therefore, monitoring is being carried out 
even if the controller or processor’s primary intention is to track the technical 
processes on its website, but in doing so it processes personal data in a way 
which would make it possible to track a data subject’s internet activities. 
Consequently, the GDPR covers in particular all forms of tracking and 
profiling on the internet with the use of analysis tools, such as cookies for 
example, which enable the tracking of individual users and pursue 
individualized advertising purposes.77 Likewise, the application of the 
 
 73. As already argued by Manuel Klar, Räumliche Anwendbarkeit des  
(Europäischen) Datenschutzrechts – Ein Vergleich am Beispiel von Satelliten-, Luft- und 
Panoramastraßenaufnahmen, 3 Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 109, 113 (2013). 
 74. Critical in this regard: Paul M. Schwartz, EU Privacy and the Cloud: Consent and 
Jurisdiction under the Proposed Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. 1, 3 
(2013).  
 75. The draft of the European Commission and that of the Council likewise only mention 
“monitoring.” 
 76. See Schwartz, supra note 62, at 1652. 
 77. Doubtful: Wimmer, supra note 8, at 555 et seq. 
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GDPR is triggered by other “value-added services”78 with which, for 
example, a cloud provider records the data volume used by its cloud user in 
order to offer it a larger storage quota if a certain capacity is exceeded.79 But 
in each case this requires that the data that are processed in the course of the 
monitoring have a reference to specific persons. 
Article 3(2)(b) GDPR stipulates that the monitored behavior must take 
place “within the Union”. The purpose of this provision is evidently to limit 
the application of the GDPR to the processing of personal data of those data 
subjects who are physically within the European Union during the 
monitoring. As a rule, it can be determined whether or not this is the case by 
the IP address of the data subject’s terminal equipment. Thus, data 
processing in connection with the use of the internet by a data subject who 
is in an internet cafe in the U.S. would not fall within the scope of the GDPR. 
Ultimately, this provision is merely of an informative nature, since the lack 
of applicability of the GDPR in this exemplary case is already secured by the 
fact that pursuant to Article 3(2) GDPR, the data subject must be “in the 
Union”. 
Since Article 3(2)(b) GDPR does not draw any distinction in this 
respect, any monitoring of behavior would falls under the scope of the 
GDPR, regardless of whether or not it is directed at data subjects in the 
Union.80 The criterion of apparent envisaging pursuant to recital 23 of the 
GDPR does not apply in the context of Article 3(2)(b) GDPR – as opposed 
to Article 3(2)(a) GDPR.81 It therefore seems to be the case that any website 
operator using tracking or profiling measures anywhere in the world is 
obligated to comply with the stipulations of the GDPR. It may be able to 
evade this obligation by using geo-localization tools in the sense of a “dis-
targeting”.82 Thus, no marketplace rule in a narrow sense seems to apply in 
this regard. The European Data Protection Board therefore advocates a 
restrictive interpretation of the provision. Accordingly, it explicitly clarifies 
in its Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR that the mere 
processing of personal data of persons in the Union is not sufficient for the 
GDPR to be applicable. Rather, the element of “targeting” must also be 
 
 78. See Schwartz, supra note 74, at 2. 
 79. See Schwartz, supra note 62, at 1644. 
 80. As is presumably also argued by Peter Schantz & Heinrich A. Wolff, Das neue 
Datenschutzrecht, para. 338 (2017). 
 81. Svantesson, supra note 4, at 71. 
 82. See Svantesson, supra note 4, at 99; with regard to “false positives” which would 
lead to an application of the European legal framework, Svantesson, A “layered approach” 
to the extraterritoriality of data privacy laws, 3 IDPL 278, 284 (2013). 
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present within the scope of Article 3(2)(b) GDPR.83 Elsewhere in its 
Guidelines, it considers it necessary, with reference to recital 24, for the 
monitoring of the behavior to relate to persons in the Union.84 This can only 
be understood to mean that processing within the scope of Article 3(2)(b) 
GDPR – as already in the case of Article 3(2)(a) GDPR – must be targeted 
at persons in the Union. However, in that case it is not clear how the further 
statements of the European Data Protection Board are to be understood, 
according to which neither Article 3(2)(b) GDPR nor recital 24 introduce a 
“necessary degree of ‚intention to target’” to determine whether the 
monitoring activity would trigger the application of the GDPR to the 
processing activities.85 Consequently, the statements of the European Data 
Protection Board are not completely unequivocal. In particular, it remains 
unclear whether any, and if so what, targeting criteria are supposed to apply, 
or whether in fact the merely factual use of the tracking and profiling 
techniques is supposed to represent a “targeting” (also) of persons in the 
Union. Since the justification for a too broad interpretation would be 
questionable, the restrictive approach of the European Data Protection Board 
should definitely be encouraged (even if it would most likely be difficult to 
support this with the wording of the statute). Without such a restriction, the 
GDPR would de facto result in a global application. This is why the territorial 
scope of the GDPR has occasionally been criticized in the legal 
commentaries on data protection law as “data imperialism” in the past.86 
However, it must also be mentioned in this regard that, even under the former 
European Directive 95/46/EC, the use of cookies by controllers in third 
countries had led to the applicability of European data protection law 
according to the assessment of the Data Protection Working Party.87 In any 
 
 83. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 15: “The EDPB also wishes to 
underline that the fact of processing personal data of an individual in the Union alone is not 
sufficient to trigger the application of the GDPR to processing activities of a controller or 
processor not established in the Union. The element of “targeting” individuals in the EU, 
either by offering goods or services to them or by monitoring their behaviour (as further 
clarified below), must always be present in addition.” 
 84. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 19; and presumably also Wimmer, 
supra note 8, at 557. 
 85. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 20. 
 86. Critical on this Svantesson, supra note 82, 279; Omer Tene & Christopher Wolf, The 
Definition of Personal Data: Seeing the Complete Spectrum, White Paper of the Future of 
Privacy Forum 3 (2013). 
 87. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working document on determining the 
international application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the 
Internet by non-EU based web sites, WP 56, 10 et seq. (2002). See on Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, supra note 23. 
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case, the scope of the provision in practice would most likely be limited by 
the fact that in many cases there is no obligation to appoint a representative 
in the Union. Article 27(1) GDPR requires every controller or processor 
established outside of the European Union to designate a representative in 
the Union. Under Article 27(2) GDPR, this obligation does not exist if the 
data processing is occasional, does not include, on a large scale, processing 
of special categories of data as referred to in Article 9(1) GDPR or 
processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences and 
is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
taking into account the nature, context, scope and purposes of the 
processing.88 These prerequisites are most likely met if a website operator 
established in the U.S. uses cookies on its English-language website (which 
is primarily called up in the US, but in a few cases also in the EU) and thereby 
also covers users in the European Union to a slight extent. Moreover, the 
possibility cannot be excluded that in such cases, the GDPR would already 
be inapplicable since the data which are processed do not have a reference 
to specific persons.89 
 
4.  Unreasonable Extraterritorial Effects Due to the New 
Marketplace Rule? 
 
Before the GDPR entered into force, under European Directive 
95/46/EC which prevailed at the time, European data protection law applied 
for controllers established outside of the European Union only if the data 
processing made use of “equipment, automated or otherwise”, which was 
situated on the territory of the relevant Member State.90 The only exception 
to this would be if this equipment was used solely for purposes of transit 
through the territory of the European Community.91 Thus, under the previous 
European Directive 95/46/EC, a territoriality rule applied in this regard 
 
 88. The minimum threshold of 250 employees of the controller which was provided for 
in the European Commission’s draft was not included in the final text of the GDPR.  
 89. With regard to the ECJ’s requirement that it be possible to resort to “legal means” in 
order to connect information to an identifiable natural person, see ECJ Case C-582/14, Patrick 
Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, at para. 47 et seq., 
(available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=184668&pag 
eIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=995986). A website operator 
established in the U.S., for example, could most likely not easily be able to avail itself of such 
legal means. 
 90. See Article 4(1)(c) Directive 95/46/EC. 
 91. See Article 4(1)(c) Directive 95/46/EC and Moniz, supra note 18, at 107. 
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which proved to be unsatisfactory, particularly with regard to internet 
matters.92 
Both criteria were abandoned in the course of the introduction of the 
GDPR and the establishment of a marketplace rule in Article 3(2) GDPR.93 
The marketplace rule is recognized in the EU in other legal contexts as well, 
such as European competition and consumer protection law.94 Beyond that, 
a recourse to criteria relating to the marketplace is also established in other 
legal systems and to some extent in the U.S. as well, where a marketplace 
rule can also be decisive in determining the applicable law. This applies, for 
example, to domestic matters which only cross state borders.95 A 
marketplace rule is also applied in the USA with regard to international 
matters.96 For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which is also 
responsible for compliance with data protection regulations, avails itself of 
“targeting” criteria to ascertain the relevant law,97 with the result that 
European website operators can also be subject to U.S. data protection 
provisions.98 Accordingly, the FTC stressed, for example, that the provisions 
of the “Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act” (COPPA) also apply to 
 
 92. See Azzi, supra note 2, at 128; Moniz, supra note 18, at 110. 
 93. See also Schwartz, supra note 62, at 1643. 
 94. The conflict of laws provision in Article 6(1) Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. L 199/40, explicitly provides with regard to non-
contractual obligations arising out of an act of unfair competition that the applicable is that of 
the country where competitive relations or the collective interests of consumers are, or are 
likely to be, affected; see also Azzi, supra note 2, at 129. 
 95. With regard to the so-called minimum contact test, see International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); on the “Zippo test” in relation to internet matters, see 
Western District of Pennsylvania, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (1997); instructive on the development 
of the law in the U.S.: Eric C. Hawking, General Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts: What 
Role, if any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2371 (2006); Kimberly Houser & Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook 
or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 66 (2018); Alan M. Trammell 
& Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the Interwebs, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129 
(2015). 
 96. See the examples given by Azzi, supra note 2, at 132; Houser & Voss, supra note 
87, at 67 et seq.; Richard Abraham & Colin Loveday, The General Data Protection 
Regulation – Another Key Compliance Area for Global Business, DEFENSE COUNSEL JOURNAL 
3, 15 (2018).  
 97. See Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and U.S. Perspectives, 
30 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 161, 188 (2012) with further references. See also Wimmer, supra 
note 8, at 568 et seq. 
 98. For a more detailed explanation, see Manuel Klar & Jürgen Kühling, Privatheit und 
Datenschutz in der EU und den USA – Kollission zweier Welten?, 141 Archiv des öffentlichen 
Rechts 165, 220 (2016). 
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offers by operators of foreign websites insofar as they are directed at children 
in the U.S.99 Finally, the most recently reformed California100 and 
Japanese101 data protection laws also contain a provision which is very 
similar to the marketplace rule in the GDPR. 
The distinguishing feature of the marketplace rule is that it stipulates 
that the applicable law is that of the place of the final intervention in the 
market and the place at which the other side of the market is impacted in the 
sense of a “targeting”. As shown above,102 the contours of the marketplace 
rule are blurry in some respects.103 For example, the provisions in Article 
 
 99. See FTC, Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, March 2015, 
(available at https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-fre 
quently-asked-questions); see also the California Business and Professions Code, whose 
definition of the term “operator” (see 22580 (f) and 22584 (a)) would most likely also include 
European website operators. In the past, the FTC had already informally written to foreign 
app providers, calling their attention to their violation of COPPA rules, see the FTC’s letter 
of December 17, 2014 to a Chinese app provider, (available at https://www.ftc.gov/syst 
em/files/documents/public_statements/606451/141222babybusletter.pdf). For more on the 
extraterritorial effect of COPPA, see Wimmer, supra note 8, at 568 et seq. 
 100. See California Civil Code section 1798.140(c): “(c) ‘Business’ means: 
(1) A sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or 
other legal entity that is organized or operated for the profit or financial benefit of its 
shareholders or other owners, that collects consumers’ personal information, or on the behalf 
of which such information is collected and that alone, or jointly with others, determines the 
purposes and means of the processing of consumers’ personal information, that does business 
in the State of California, and that satisfies one or more of the following thresholds: 
(A) Has annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000), as 
adjusted pursuant to paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 1798.185. 
(B) Alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for the business’s commercial purposes, 
sells, or shares for commercial purposes, alone or in combination, the personal information of 
50,000 or more consumers, households, or devices. 
(C) Derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal 
information.”; see also Lothar Determann, New California Law Against Data Sharing, 2 
COMPUTER LAW REVIEW INTERNATIONAL 117, 118 (2018). 
 101. See Article 75 of the Amended Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI): 
“The provisions of Article 15, Article 16, Article 18 (excluding paragraph (2)), Article 19 
through Article 25, Article 27 thorough Article 36, Article 41, Article 42, paragraph (1), 
Article 43 and the following Article shall also apply in those cases where a personal 
information handling business operator who in relation to supplying a good or service to a 
person in Japan has acquired personal information relating to the person being as a principal 
handles in a foreign country the personal information or anonymously processed information 
produced by using the said personal information.” 
 102. See II. A. 2. above. 
 103. As also argued by de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 239; Philip N. Yannella 
& Kristen Poetzel, European Data Protection Board Draft Guidelines on Extraterritorial 
Scope of the GDPR Provide Few Clear Answers for U.S. Companies, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 1, 
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3(2) GDPR contain a great deal of new terminology which is not explained 
any further in either the text of the GDPR or its recitals. Although Article 3 
GDPR is a key provision of the GDPR, and its precise scope for companies 
established outside of the European Union is of decisive importance, there 
are virtually no indications of the genesis of the provision in the legislative 
materials. In the legislative notes on the European Commission’s draft with 
regard to Article 3 GDPR, under the heading “Detailed explanation of the 
proposal“ there is merely the cursory remark “Article 3 determines the 
territorial scope of the Regulation”.104 Although the European Data 
Protection Board has meanwhile published guidelines on the territorial scope 
of the GDPR,105 the specifics are nonetheless disputed, so the scope of the 
marketplace rule in the future will depend decisively on its interpretation by 
the ECJ. It has in any case indicated in the recent past that it is by no means 
contemplating construing the EU data protection requirements 
restrictively.106 In its widely noted Google Spain decision, it had in fact still 
based itself on marketplace-related criteria under European Directive 
95/46/EC with regard to search engine operators, thus essentially 
anticipating the new Article 3(2) GDPR.107 This interpretation of the data 
protection provisions by the ECJ, taking fundamental rights duly into 
account, can also be expected to apply now that the GDPR is in effect. In 
this connection it is to be hoped that the discussion on a balance between 
data protection and the interests of data processers is approached with a sense 
of proportion and that the ECJ will see the risk that decisions which are all 
too hostile to data processing could contribute to European technology 
companies falling further behind their U.S. competitors economically. 
 
2018), (available at https://www.natlawreview.com/article/edpb-draft-guidelines-extraterri 
torial-scope-gdpr-provide-few-clear-answers-us). 
 104. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final 
version, 7. 
 105. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19. 
 106. ECJ Case C-210/16, supra note 6; ECJ Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner, 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:650; ECJ Case C-131/12, supra note 35; 
ECJ Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung 
and Others, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf?text=&docid=150642&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=997468). 
 107. ECJ Case C-131/12, supra note 35, at para. 55. Critical of the decision: Lee A. 
Bygrave, A Right to Be Forgotten?, 58 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 35, 36 (2015). 
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Outside of Europe, the marketplace rule of the GDPR largely met with 
a critical reception108 and in particular reference was made to the risk that e-
commerce would be weakened, since especially small or medium-sized 
companies which cannot afford the requisite legal expertise would be 
disadvantaged.109 In Europe, the aspect of the new approach that received the 
most praise was the equality of competition between companies in and 
outside of the European Union.110 In point of fact, despite some of its 
technical weaknesses, the marketplace rule in Article 3(2) GDPR represents 
a middle course. It finds itself between an approach which is linked to the 
applicability of European data protection law where the controller has its 
registered office on the one hand (origin approach)111 and is based on the 
nationality of the data subject on the other. Inherent to the first alternative is 
obviously the risk of forum shopping, since a controller could all too easily 
evade compliance with data protection requirements by choosing a registered 
office outside of the European Union.112 In the second case, due to the 
ubiquity of the internet, every website operator would have to comply with 
a large number of legal systems simultaneously, since it has no control over 
who calls up its website. By creating a mediating balance between the two 
positions, the marketplace rule is theoretically able to resolve the contending 
interests of the players involved in the data processing in an appropriate 
manner. Against this background, the regulators correctly refrained from 
following the approach of taking only the data subject’s residence in the 
European Union as a basis with regard to any and all data processing. In fact, 
there is no good reason why an EU citizen who, for example, buys a prepaid 
 
 108. See for example Schwartz, supra note 62, at 1643; Tene & Wolf, supra note 86, at 
4; additionally Svantesson, supra note 9, at para. 28 and supra note 4, at 68 et seq.; Dan Jerker 
B. Svantesson, Extraterritoriality and targeting in EU data privacy law: the weak spot 
undermining the regulation, 6 IDPL 226, 230 (2015); critical in some respects: de Hert & 
Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 239; Gömann, supra note 9, at 588. 
 109. Cindy Chen, United States and European Union Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction 
and their Impact on E-Commerce, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 423, 443 (2004). 
 110. See the Study of the Directorate-General for internal Policies, (Direction A), 
Reforming the Data Protection Package, 48 (2012): “This core innovation of the proposal 
will not only improve the data protection standard within the EU, but also ensure the better 
functioning of the internal market. By making EU data protection legislation applicable to all 
providers active within the EU, potential disadvantages which are faced by service providers 
based within the EU due to its stricter data protection legislation will be ironed out. This 
would create an EU-wide level playing field and could therefore improve the competitiveness 
of service providers based within the EU.” 
 111. See de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 235. 
 112. de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 235. 
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card as a tourist in the US, should reap the benefits of European data 
protection law.113 
With regard to fundamental rights as well, the marketplace rule would 
appear to be logical in light of European legal traditions. After all, the state 
has a protective function both with regard to fundamental rights and under 
international law.114 This function is also activated with respect to data 
processing abroad and requires that state bodies must adequately ensure that 
the (fundamental) data processing rights are generally safeguarded even 
when data is processed by foreign entities.115 This involves the privacy rights 
of data subjects which are increasingly stressed by the ECJ116 to the same 
extent as the creation of competitive equality between European companies 
and companies in third countries which are active on the European market.117 
Against this background and in particular in light of the provision’s clear 
reference to the EU, expanding the scope of the European data protection 
requirements would not appear to be inequitable per se.118 Accordingly, the 
scope of Article 3(2) GDPR extends to the processing of personal data of 
data subjects who are “in the Union” and to offers of goods or services “in 
the Union”, as well as to monitored behavior that takes place “within the 
Union”. At least with this approach, it can be ensured that only those matters 
which actually have a sufficient relationship to the European Union fall 
under European data protection law.119 Any ambiguities can be handled with 
a correspondingly restrictive interpretation of the provision. The 
applicability of the GDPR should therefore not come as that much of a 
surprise for U.S. companies, since they are only targeted by it if they target 
the EU with their activities.120 
The expansion of the European data protection requirements led many 
to call attention to the problem of the enforceability of the legal standards.121 
 
 113. Likewise Moniz, supra note 18, at 113. 
 114. On the existence of state protective duties, also with regard to interventions by 
foreign countries, see Klar & Kühling, supra note 98, at 219. 
 115. Klar & Kühling, supra note 98, at 221. 
 116. See supra note 20. 
 117. See Study of the Directorate-General for internal Policies, (Direction A), Reforming 
the Data Protection Package 48 (2012). 
 118. Ultimately also de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 238. 
 119. Critical of this: de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 239; Svantesson, supra note 
9, at para. 28 and supra note 108, at 230. 
 120. de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 231: “You might be targeted by EU law only 
if you target.” 
 121. See Svantesson, supra note 108, at 232, arguing that the GDPR “bites off more than 
it can chew”; de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 242; generally critical: Jeffrey Rosen, 
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They stressed the fact that the data protection authorities would naturally 
only be able to exert influence within the borders of the European Union and 
that they could only have the authority to investigate and enforce outside of 
the EU in accordance with interstate treaties which as yet do not exist, thus 
limiting their options for action outside of the European Union per se.122 
However, law which cannot be enforced would serve no purpose.123 Along 
these lines, the Data Protection Working Party also stated already with regard 
to former European Directive 95/46/EC that the data protection laws should 
(only) be applicable “where it is necessary, where it makes sense and where 
there is a reasonable degree of enforceability having regard to the cross-
frontier situation involved.”124 The enforcement of the GDPR’s rules should 
in any case be facilitated by the fact that pursuant to Article 27(1) GDPR, 
every controller or processor established outside of the European Union has 
to designate a representative in the Union.125 Under Article 27(2) GDPR, this 
obligation ceases to apply only if the data processing is carried out on an 
occasional basis, does not cover any special categories of personal data 
within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR or data relating to criminal 
convictions and offences pursuant to Article 10 GDPR and it is unlikely to 
result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, taking into 
account the nature, context, scope and purposes of the processing. Moreover, 
a violation of the duty to appoint a representative pursuant to Article 83(4)(a) 
GDPR is now subject to a fine, which was not the case previously.126 
 
B.  Material Scope 
 
In order for the GDPR to apply for U.S. companies, they must fall not 
only within the territorial scope described above, but within its material 
scope as well, which is defined in Article 2 GDPR. In addition to the 
stipulations on the territorial applicability of the GDPR, this provision 
represents a further key standard for its applicability, as it applies only for 
the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means (Article 
2(1) GDPR). On the other hand, it does not apply if personal data are merely 
 
The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 92 (2012): “Europeans have a long 
tradition of declaring abstract privacy rights in theory that they fail to enforce in practice.” 
 122. de Hert & Czerniawski, supra note 2, at 242. 
 123. Tene & Wolf, supra note 86, at 4; see also Bygrave, supra note 107, at 252. 
 124. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 87, at 9. 
 125. See also Azzi, supra note 2, at 133. 
 126. For more information on the representative, see under V. A. 
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processed by natural persons in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity (so-called “household exemption”).127 
The questions of what prerequisites are to be placed on the criterion of 
“automated and non-automated processing” and how the term “personal 
data” and the criteria for “household exemptions” are to be interpreted will 
be taken up in the following section. 
 
1.  Automated and Non-Automated Processing  
 
The GDPR only applies in a material sense where personal data are 
processed wholly or partly by automated means (Article 2(1) GDPR). For 
non-automated processing, the GDPR applies only if the personal data are 
contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system.128  
Thus, it must first of all be ascertained how the GDPR’s use of the term 
“processing” is to be understood. In its definition of “processing” in  
Article 4 no. 2, the GDPR summarizes a great many forms of processing. 
The term “processing” means any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by 
automated means. The first step in an ideally typical processing procedure 
would be the collection or recording of personal data. This can be followed 
by the organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination or restriction of the data. 
Finally, there is the erasure or destruction of the personal data. 
If (as in most situations), a processing is taking place, it must be 
ascertained whether it is being carried out wholly or partly by automated 
means. Here, it must be taken into account that even for a non-automated 
processing of personal data, Article 2(1) GDPR stipulates that the GDPR is 
applicable insofar as the information is contained, or is intended to be 
contained in a filing system. A processing wholly or partly by automated 
means is always present if data processing equipment is used. The GDPR 
does not provide a specific definition of an automated processing with the 
use of data processing equipment, let alone any examples. This is to be 
understood as a deliberate decision, since the GDPR is also supposed to 
cover future technological developments.129 It is of no relevance in 
connection with automated processing whether the files are stored in any 
 
 127. See Article 2(2)(c) GDPR. 
 128. See JÜRGEN KÜHLING & MANUEL KLAR & FLORIAN SACKMANN, DATENSCHUTZRECHT 
99 (4th ed. 2018). 
 129. See recital 15 of the GDPR. 
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structured manner. The distinction between a wholly or partly automated 
processing is to be drawn on the basis of possible manual interim steps.130 
For example, a partly automated processing is present if the data are 
collected by a person, and not directly by a data processing system. 
Along with data processing that is carried out wholly or partly by 
automated means, the scope of the GDPR additionally also covers the non-
automated processing of personal data subject to certain prerequisites. 
According to recital 15, the term non-automated processing in the GDPR is 
understood to mean purely manual processing. Since it is already sufficient 
for an assumption of partly automated processing if an individual partial step 
is carried out automatically, this would mean conversely that in manual 
processing, no processing steps may be automated at all. The main case in 
which non-automated processing would apply would most likely be when 
information is recorded, for example with a pen on a sheet of paper. The 
GDPR restricts its scope with regard to manual processing such that it is 
applicable only if the information is contained or is intended to be contained 
in a filing system. Pursuant to Article 4 no. 6 GDPR, this would mean any 
structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific 
criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or 
geographical basis. Accordingly, pursuant to recital 15 of the GDPR, files or 
sets of files, as well as their cover pages, which are not structured according 
to specific criteria should not fall within the scope of the GDPR. Such criteria 
could perhaps be a classification by year, file number or name, for example 
in alphabetical order. As a rule, a collection could be referred to as a structure 
if it can be sorted according to more than two criteria. According to the ECJ, 
a “filing system” covers a set of personal data, if those data are structured 
according to specific criteria which, in practice, enable them to be easily 
retrieved for subsequent use.131 
 
2.  Personal Data 
 
What is also of key importance for the applicability of the GDPR is 
whether the U.S. company processes “personal data”.132 Since the term 
“personal data” is very broadly construed in European law, in some cases 
this results in very clear differences from the semantic definitions under U.S. 
 
 130. Kühling & Klar & Sackmann, supra note 128, at 101. 
 131. ECJ Case C-25/17, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, (available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=203822&pageIndex=0&d
oclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2129026). 
 132. On the term “personal data,” see Manuel Klar & Jürgen Kühling, in DS-GVO/BDSG, 
Art. 4 Nr. 1 DS-GVO (Jürgen Kühling & Benedikt Buchner, 2nd ed. 2018). 
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law which, for example, unlike the GDPR, does not classify publicly 
accessible data as personal.133 
According to the GDPR, personal data comprise any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (Article 4 no. 1 GDPR). 
A identifiable person should already be considered to be one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier, 
such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. 
Personal data are only information which relates to a natural person. 
The GDPR defines these persons as “data subjects”. Legal entities, as well 
as groups of persons, are excluded from the scope of protection. However, 
where information on a group of persons “spills over” to an identified or 
identifiable member, this information comprises personal data.134 That can 
be the case, for example, if a statement is made on the financial situation of 
a partnership or a “one-person company.” 
Article 4 no. 1 GDPR comprehends without restriction “any 
information” relating to a person and is therefore to be understood broadly. 
This provision covers both personal information used in context such as 
identifiers (e.g., name, address and date of birth), external factors (such as 
gender, eye color, height and weight) or internal conditions (e.g., opinions, 
motives, desires, convictions and value judgments), as well as objective 
information such as financial and ownership situation, communication and 
contractual relationships and all other relationships of the data subjects to 
third parties and their environment. The significance or privacy law 
implication of the information is of no relevance. Even the information that 
person X has two arms comprises personal data within the meaning of  
Article 4 no. 1 GDPR.  
Pursuant to Article 4 no. 1 GDPR, the information must “relate” to a 
natural person. So-called “data related to things” do not pertain to a person, 
but merely to a thing. This is the case, for example, with the statement 
 
 133. See, e.g., California Civil Code section 1798.140(o)(2): “‘Personal information’ does 
not include publicly available information. For these purposes, ‘publicly available’ means 
information that is lawfully made available from federal, state, or local government records, 
if any conditions associated with such information. ‘Publicly available’ does not mean 
biometric information collected by a business about a consumer without the consumer’s 
knowledge. Information is not ‘publicly available’ if that data is used for a purpose that is not 
compatible with the purpose for which the data is maintained and made available in the 
government records or for which it is publicly maintained. ‘Publicly available’ does not 
include consumer information that is deidentified or aggregate consumer information.” 
 134. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of 
personal data, WP 136, 23 (2007) with regard to the earlier European Directive 95/46/EC. 
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“Mount Everest is the highest mountain on Earth” or “House X costs 400,000 
dollars”. This applies even if a U.S. company or a third party is aware that 
Person A has climbed Mount Everest or is the owner of house X. However, 
a great number of contentious cases would be conceivable under European 
law which would require a nuanced solution in each individual case. 
Demarcation issues arise above all in connection with machine-to-machine 
communication by everyday objects which are connected to the internet, 
such as vehicles, kitchen appliances or wearables (“Internet of Things”). As 
a rule, these are not to be considered to be data related to things. Data related 
to things can be differentiated from personal data by taking the context-
related approach, which the Data Protection Working Party had developed 
to the term “personal data” under the preceding European Directive 
95/46/EC. It stated that information relates to a natural person (and not to a 
thing), if a content element, a purpose element or a result element is 
present.135 A content element exists where information is given about a 
person which is to be assessed in light of all circumstances surrounding the 
case and regardless of any purpose on the part of the data controller or a third 
party or the impact of that information on the data subject. A purpose element 
exist if the information can be used for the purpose of evaluating a person, 
treating them in a certain way or influencing them. Finally, even if no content 
or purpose element exists, a result element will always exist if there is a risk 
that the information, in light of all circumstances surrounding the case, can 
have an impact on a certain person’s rights and interests. This can be the 
case, for example, with information on the economic utilization and 
exploitation of real estate. 
Pursuant to Article 4 no. 1 GDPR, the information must relate to an 
“identified or identifiable” person. An identified person is one who can be 
identified directly from the information itself.136 This is the case, for 
example, if the information contains an identifier (e.g., name, address and 
date of birth) of the person or the content of the information or the context 
allow for the unique identification of that person without the need to make 
use of additional information. On the other hand, a person is identifiable if 
the information in and of itself is not sufficient to attribute it to a person, but 
this is possible once the information is linked to additional information.137 
Pursuant to recital 26 of the GDPR, in order to determine whether a person 
is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to 
 
 135. See already on European Directive 95/46/EC Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, supra note 134, at 9. 
 136. ECJ Case C-582/14, supra note 89, at para. 38. 
 137. Klar & Kühling, supra note 132, at para. 19. 
1 - KLAR_HSTLJ11-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2020  8:15 AM 
Summer 2020] GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 131 
be used either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural 
person directly or indirectly. Identifying these means requires, according to 
recital 26 of the GDPR, that all of the information that is known or available 
about the data subject, as well as all objective factors, such as the cost of and 
amount of time required for identification, be taken into account. The extent 
to which the knowledge and means of third parties which can be used to 
identify a person are also to be taken into account is disputed. The ECJ has 
found that a reference to specific persons exists in connection with IP 
addresses if and insofar as the website operator has the legal means to access 
the data of the third parties, i. e. the internet service provider.138 However, 
possibilities for doing so which are prohibited by law should not come into 
question.139 
A subcategory of personal data is pseudonymous data. This includes 
data which are processed in such a manner that the personal data can no 
longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional 
information (cf. Article 4 no. 5 GDPR). This definition is similar to that in 
the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which contains a similar 
definition of the term.140 With regard to the additional information, it must 
be ensured that it is kept separately and is subject to technical and 
organizational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to 
an identified or identifiable natural person. Characteristic for pseudonymous 
data is thus – in contrast to anonymous data (see below) – the existence of 
an attribution rule which provides the data collected under a pseudonym  
with an identifier of a person. As Article 32(1)(a) GDPR clarifies, 
pseudonymization is merely a security measure.141 
Anonymous data do not fall under the category of personal data. 
Accordingly, as set out in recital 26 of the GDPR, the principles of data 
protection law do not apply for anonymous information. The question of 
whether a natural person is no longer identifiable and the data are thus 
anonymous must be examined in accordance with recital 26 of the GDPR, 
i.e. account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used 
 
 138. See ECJ Case C-582/14, supra note 89, at para. 47 et seq. 
 139. ECJ Case C-582/14, supra note 89, at para. 46. 
 140. California Civil Code section 1798.140(r): “‘Pseudonymize’ or ‘Pseudonymization’ 
means the processing of personal information in a manner that renders the personal 
information no longer attributable to a specific consumer without the use of additional 
information, provided that the additional information is kept separately and is subject to 
technical and organizational measures to ensure that the personal information is not attributed 
to an identified or identifiable consumer.” 
 141. Likewise already Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on 
Anonymisation Techniques, WP 216, 3, 10 (2014). 
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either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person 
directly or indirectly, whereby in particular the cost of and amount of time 
required for identification are to be taken into account. The GDPR does not 
stipulate what technical requirements have to be met by an anonymization. 
However, recital 26 of the GDPR does provide that when ascertaining 
whether a person is identifiable, the available technology at the time of the 
processing and technical developments must be taken into account. 
Consequently, the anonymization procedure used must at least be in 
accordance with the current state of the art. 
 
3.  Household Exemption 
 
Another exceptional case, which is known as the “household 
exemption”, is regulated in Article 2(2)(c) GDPR, under which data 
processing is not subject to the GDPR if it is carried out by a natural person 
in the course of a purely personal or household activity. The GDPR does not 
provide a specific definition or demarcation of the terms “personal” or 
“household” activity. This exception is an expression of the fact that the 
private sphere is generally protected in Europe by fundamental rights.142 One 
criterion for demarcation formulated by recital 18 of the GDPR is the lack of 
any connection whatsoever to a professional or commercial activity, and it 
cites as examples of personal and household activities correspondence and 
the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken 
within the context of such activities. Whether or not data processing is of a 
personal or household nature is determined according to generally accepted 
standards. With regard to the social networking that is cited in recital 18 of 
the GDPR, a nuanced examination is necessary on the basis of the criterion 
of accessibility.143 As long as the use is carried out in such a way that a 
merely limited group of persons obtains knowledge of information, such as 
in the course of individual or group messages, however, the exception can 
be applicable.144 
However, the exception does not apply for the publication of 
information for an indeterminate group of people. The ECJ has already taken 
 
 142. See Kühling & Klar & Sackmann, supra note 128, at 102-103. 
 143. European Data Protection Supervisor, Executive summary EDPS Opinion of 7 
March 2012 on the data protection reform package, 2012/C 192/05, 2012 O.J. C 192/7, 9. 
 144. Jürgen Kühling & Johannes Raab, in DS-GVO/BDSG, Art. 2 DS-GVO para. 25 
(Jürgen Kühling & Benedikt Buchner, 2nd ed. 2018). 
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a position on this point in its Lindqvist145 and Satamedia146 judgments and 
does not subsume a public disclosure under the corresponding exception set 
out in Directive 95/46/EC (which was still in force at the time). Despite 
mentioning social networking in its recitals, the GDPR does not seek to 
derogate from this case law. However, since this point has not been clarified 
in the legislative process, it is to be expected that ECJ will take it up further. 
But even if private or household processing is covered by the exception in a 
specific case, the providers of such internet platforms cannot likewise invoke 
the exception for themselves that is applicable to its users. This is made clear 
by recital 18 of the GDPR at the end where it places the controllers which 
provide the means for processing the users’ data within the scope of the 
GDPR. Moreover, the wording of the provision is very narrow in that it 
requires a use “purely” for the purpose of personal or household activities. 
Thus, the exception does not apply to mixed data collections, such as 
address books, which contain both private and business contacts. A video 
surveillance of the private sphere can also be covered by the exception since 
the security and safety of one’s own home is to be deemed to be a private 
purpose. However, according to a more recent decision of the ECJ, this does 
not apply if at the same time a public area, such as the street in front of the 
house, is also recorded.147 
 
III.  Applicability of National Data Protection Law of the  
EU Member States 
 
Along with the possibility of being directly bound by the stipulations of 
the GDPR (see II. above), U.S. companies can also be subjected to certain 
data protection regulations which are enacted not by the European legislature 
but by the Member States of the European Union whose territorial scope 
might also extend to U.S. companies.  
 
 145. ECJ Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, (available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=48382&pageIndex=0&doc
lang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=998664). 
 146. ECJ Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy, 2008 ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, at para. 43 et seq., (available at http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=76075&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=999192). 
 147. ECJ Case C-212/13, František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, 2014 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428, at para. 33, (available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf?text=&docid=160561&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=999597); cf. Manuel Klar, Private Videoüberwachung unter Miterfassung des 
öffentlichen Raums, 68 Neue Juristische Woche 463 (2015). 
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For example, the GDPR contains a rather large number of opening 
clauses which make it possible for individual Member States to specify the 
provisions of the GDPR in national data protection provisions with regard to 
various matters. Such possibilities to specify exist, for example, in the areas 
of employee data protection,148 scientific research,149 processing for 
journalistic, scientific, artistic or literary purposes,150 the processing of 
sensitive data151 or within the scope of Article 23 GDPR, which contains a 
comprehensive and general opening clause allowing the Member States and 
the European Union to derogate from the GDPR’s provisions and further 
restrict the rights of data subjects. 
The harmonizing effect of the GDPR in the Member States of the 
European Union is called into question to a great extent by these opening 
clauses. They ultimately resulted from a compromise between the legislative 
bodies, since in the new era of the GDPR many Member States have sought 
to “keep alive” to the greatest possible extent their data protection 
regulations which had existed up to the applicability of the GDPR, and of 
which they had become very fond. However, extensive national regulations 
jeopardize the actual harmonization objective of the GDPR, namely the 
elimination of the “patchwork quilt” of national data protection regimes 
which had existed up to the applicability of the GDPR on May 25, 2018. 
Moreover, each time a Member State avails itself of opening clauses, the 
question of whether its provisions are in conformity with EU law arises, 
which then gives rise to legal uncertainty in this regard. 
Furthermore, if the Member States make use of these opening clauses, 
it is largely unclear whether, and if so on what basis, these sectoral 
requirements can lay claim to validity outside of the borders of the respective 
Member State.152 The GDPR does not contain any provisions with regard to 
the territorial scope of national data protection regulations which are enacted 
on the basis of the GDPR’s opening clauses, even though the European Data 
Protection Supervisor had called attention to this failing at an early stage.153 
Article 3 GDPR does not apply in this regard, even analogously. This leads 
to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty for U.S. companies, since it will 
 
 148. See Article 88 GDPR. 
 149. See for example Article 89 GDPR. 
 150. Article 85(2) GDPR. 
 151. See Article 9(2)(a) GDPR. 
 152. See Klar, supra note 15, at para. 107. 
 153. See European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 143, 9. The European Data 
Protection Supervisor acts as a supervisory authority specifically for the institutions and 
bodies of the EU (see Article 16(2) sentence 2 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union – TFEU). 
1 - KLAR_HSTLJ11-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2020  8:15 AM 
Summer 2020] GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 135 
often not be entirely clear when the national data protection regulations 
actually have extraterritorial validity. This is the case, for example, with 
regard to the German provisions in section 1(4) sentence 2 no. 1 of the 
German Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz – BDSG), 
the repercussions of which are quite simply absurd as far as extraterritorial 
matters are concerned.154 Under this provision, German data protection law 
applies if, for example, a U.S. company has personal data processed by a 
computer or even merely a server in Germany. Under certain circumstances 
this can in fact lead to an unfortunate situation in which even though the U.S. 
company does not fall under the provisions of the GDPR (see above), it 
nonetheless has to comply with the requirements of the German Federal Data 
Protection Act, which actually was only supposed to make the GDPR’s 
requirements more precise. Here too, it can only be hoped that the European 
and national legislatures will recognize the need for adjustment and fine-tune 
their respective regulations accordingly in their next “revision round”. 
 
IV.  Contractual Subjection to the Rules of the GDPR 
 
Along with a direct subjection to the European data protection 
requirements (see above under III.), situations can arise in which U.S. 
companies are only indirectly confronted with them. This is the case if 
European contracting parties urge the conclusion of certain data protection 
contracts which are mandatory in certain situations due to the GDPR, and 
the EU undertaking could face a fine if it does not meet this requirement.155 
In such cases, even if they do not have to comply with the GDPR directly, 
U.S. companies could at least be contractually obligated to meet the data 
protection level stipulated by the GDPR. Here it should be noted that the 
contents of these contracts are frequently explicitly stipulated and changes 
are only possible to a limited extent. This can have a direct impact on the 
understanding of the respective other contracting party in the course of 
contractual negotiations. The following contractual scenarios would come 
into consideration in this regard.  
 
 
 154. Pursuant to section 1(4) sentence 2 no. 1 of the German Federal Data Protection Act, 
the provisions of the Act apply to all public bodies if the controller or processor processes 
personal data in Germany. Consequently, this regulation links to the location of the data 
processing and thus bases itself on a criterion which the European legislators had in any case 
deliberately avoided with regard to the GDPR. In this regard, the provision is in direct conflict 
with the approach taken by EU law. 
 155. See Article 83(4)(a) GDPR. 
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A. Agreement on Commissioned Data Processing 
 
If U.S. companies act as so-called processors for European companies, 
EU companies are required by mandatory law to conclude a contract on 
commissioned data processing with the U.S. company (see Article 28(3) 
GDPR).156  
Commissioned data processing is present if a natural or legal person 
processes personal data on behalf of a controller (see Article 4 No. 8 GDPR). 
Accordingly, the decisive factor is the commissioning of personal data 
processing where the contractor is not itself a “controller” within the 
meaning of Article 4 No 7 GDPR. Unlike a controller, a processor does not 
determine the purposes and means of the data processing, but merely 
processes the data strictly as instructed for the purposes set by the principal. 
Typical examples of processors are IT service providers in the areas of 
hosting, Software as a Service (SaaS), other cloud services or call centers 
which collect customer data as stipulated by the principal and only for its 
business purposes (e.g. conclusion of contracts or handling of complaints). 
German supervisory authorities have found in the past that commissioned 
data processing is also present with regard to the use of Google Analytics,157 
whereas they have recently taken the view that Google is to be regarded as a 
controller rather than a processor because it processes personal data for its 
own purposes. 
The content of an agreement on commissioned data processing is 
described in a fairly detailed manner in Article 28(3) GDPR. For example, 
the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of 
the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and 
the obligations and rights of the respective company have to be set out. 
Moreover, the contract must in particular stipulate that the personal data of 
the U.S. company may only be processed at the documented instruction of 
the EU company, that it is ensured that persons authorized to process the 
personal data have committed themselves to confidentiality or are under an 
appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality, that all necessary 
technical and organizational measures are taken and that the particular 
requirements of the GDPR regarding the engagement of other processors are 
complied with. Furthermore, it must stipulate that the EU company is to be 
assisted in ensuring compliance with its obligations under the GDPR and that 
 
 156. See also Christian M. Auty, How The GDPR Will Affect U.S. Data “Processors”, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 5 2018), (available at https://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-gdpr-
will-affect-us-data-processors). 
 157. See Der Hamburgische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit, 23rd 
Tätigkeitsbericht Datenschutz 2010/2011, 177. 
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the U.S. company will make available to the EU company all information 
necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in 
Article 28 GDPR and allow for audits and inspections. After the end of the 
provision of the processing services, all of the personal data must be deleted 
or returned at the choice of the EU company – this too is to be set out in the 
contract. As the detailed list of minimum requirements shows, when 
structuring a contract on commissioned data processing, there is not that 
much leeway for drafting individual provisions. 
It is not entirely insignificant that in the view of the European Data 
Protection Board, a contract must also be concluded if the situation is 
reversed, i.e., if a EU company acts as a processor for a U.S. company. 
However, in the assessment of the European Data Protection Board, the 
obligations set out in Article 28(3) GDPR in this regard would have to be 
modified to reflect the special situation that the U.S. company is not subject 
to the GDPR and it would therefore not make any sense for the processor to 
assist the U.S. company in complying with the requirements under the 
GDPR.158 
Finally, it is of significance that a contract on commissioned data 
processing also needs to be concluded even if the U.S. company is certified 
under the EU-US Privacy Shield.159 Nor does the conclusion of standard 
contractual clauses of the European Commission suspend an agreement on 
commissioned data processing pursuant to Article 28(3) GDPR – or vice 
versa.160 This can be extremely irritating, since the provisions strongly 
 
 158. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 12: “When it comes to a data 
processor established in the Union carrying out processing on behalf of a data controller with 
no establishment in the Union for the purposes of the processing activity and which does not 
fall under the territorial scope of the GDPR as per Article 3(2), the processor will be subject 
to the following relevant GDPR provisions directly applicable to data processors: (...) The 
obligations imposed on processors under Article 28 (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), on the duty to 
enter into a data processing agreement, with the exception of those relating to the assistance 
to the data controller in complying with its (the controller’s) own obligations under the 
GDPR.” 
 159. As is presumably also the opinion of the European Data Protection Board, supra note 
19, at 11. 
 160. This is most likely also in line with the assessment of the European Data Protection 
Board, supra note 19, at 13. However, the problem with this scenario in which the EU 
company acts as a processor for a U.S. company is that no standard clauses exist (yet) for this 
case. The standard contractual clauses of the European Commission which are available to 
date apply only to cases in which a EU company as the controller transfers personal data to a 
processor outside of the EU, see European Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on 
standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third 
countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2010) 
593, 2010 O.J. L 39/5. 
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resemble each other in many points. In practice this frequently leads to 
conflicts in priority between the different regulations. However, these 
conflicts are ultimately inherent to the GDPR and can therefore scarcely be 
sensibly resolved – this can be remedied only by the regulators or 
clarifications by the authorities.  
 
B.  Joint Controllership Agreement 
 
If the EU company and the U.S. company are deemed to be “joint 
controllers” pursuant to Article 26 GDPR, the EU company is in any case 
required by mandatory law to conclude a joint controllership agreement. 
Here too, parts of the European data protection law are extended by contract 
to U.S. companies. 
A joint controllership agreement is required if two data processing 
bodies are to be deemed to be joint controllers for the processing within the 
meaning of Article 26 GDPR. This is the case if two or more controllers 
under data protection law jointly determine the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data. In the view of the ECJ, a joint controllership is 
indicated if a natural or legal person exerts influence over the processing of 
personal data of another for his own purposes, thus participating in the 
determination of the purposes and means of that processing.161 At the same 
time, it believes that a joint controllership does not necessarily imply equal 
responsibility. Rather, the actors involved can be incorporated into the 
relevant processing in various phases and to different extents, and thus the 
degree of the responsibility of each of them is to be evaluated in 
consideration of all of the decisive circumstances of the individual case.162 
According to the ECJ, it would not be necessary for each of the actors to 
have equivalent access to the relevant personal data.163 In the assessment of 
the ECJ, a joint controllership would in any case come into consideration for 
such processing steps if the decisions on their purpose and means are actually 
made jointly.164 In the past, the ECJ held that a joint controllership exists, for 
example, between Facebook and the administrator of a Facebook Fanpage.165 
A joint controllership can also be assumed, in the view of the German data 
 
 161. ECJ Case C-25/17, Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 6. For more on the criteria, see 
also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of 
“controller” and “processor”, WP 169, 17 (2010). 
 162. ECJ Case C-210/16, Facebook Fanpages, supra note 6. 
 163. ECJ Case C-210/16, Facebook Fanpages, supra note 6; ECJ Case C-40/17, Fashion 
ID, supra note 6. 
 164. ECJ Case C-40/17, Fashion ID, supra note 6. 
 165. See ECJ Case C-210/16, Facebook Fanpages, supra note 6. 
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protection authorities, in the case of clinical medical trials if multiple 
participants (e.g., sponsor, study centers/physicians) each make decisions on 
the processing in their respective areas.  
If a joint controllership exists, the arrangement that is then to be 
concluded must regulate the respective roles and relationships of the joint 
controllers vis-à-vis the data subjects.166 Moreover, it must be established 
which of the joint controllers must fulfill what obligation under the GDPR, 
in particular with regard to the perception of the rights of the data subjects 
and who will have to fulfill which duties to provide information under 
Articles 13 and 14 GDPR.167 Finally, the essence of the arrangement must be 
made available to the data subjects.168 Notwithstanding the allocation of the 
duties internally between the joint controllers, however, the data subjects can 
assert their rights against each of the joint controllers individually.169 
It is of considerable practical relevance that a joint controllership 
agreement also needs to be concluded even if the U.S. company is certified 
under the EU-US Privacy Shield.170 The same applies where standard 
contractual clauses of the European Commission are to be concluded 
pursuant to Article 46(2)(c) GDPR (more on this below).171  
Finally, it is of importance with regard to a joint controllership that in 
the event of an unlawful processing, each of the joint controllers would be 
liable for the entire damage unless it can provide proof that it was not at 
fault.172 Even without an arrangement on joint controllership, the joint 
controllers bear jointly and several liability. However, the arrangement can 
provide for regulations on an equalization of liability in the internal 
relationship between the parties.173 It should be noted that joint and several 
liability is unlikely to apply if the U.S. company does not fall within the 




 166. See Article 26(2) sentence1 GDPR. 
 167. Article 26(1) sentence 2 GDPR. 
 168. See Article 26(2) sentence 2 GDPR. 
 169. Article 26(3) GDPR. 
 170. As is presumably also the opinion of the European Data Protection Board; supra note 
19, at 11. 
 171. This would most likely also follow from the opinion of the European Data Protection 
Board; see supra note 19, at 12.  
 172. See Article 82(4) in conjunction with (2) sentence 1 and Article 82(3) GDPR. 
 173. Article 82(5) GDPR. 
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C.  Standard Contractual Clauses of the European Commission 
 
Additionally, U.S. companies can be contractually subjected to 
European data protection law if the EU company employs the so-called 
“standard contractual clauses” of the European Commission to secure the 
transfer of data to the US. The reasoning behind this is that under Articles 44 
et seq. GDPR, European companies have to secure data transfers to 
recipients outside of the EU by means of special instruments if the European 
Commission has not determined that the third country offers an adequate 
level of data protection, as is the case with the US. If the U.S. company 
receiving the data is not certified under the “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield”, 
agreeing to the standard contractual clauses pursuant to Article 46(2)(c) 
GDPR often offers a quick and practical means in practice to structure the 
data transfer in a lawful manner.  
The European Commission had already issued corresponding 
regulations when European Directive 95/46/EC was still in force, namely 
one version of standard contractual clauses for exchanges between a 
controller and a processor (controller-processor transfer)174 and another to be 
used between controllers (controller-controller transfer).175 These 
regulations will continue to apply under the GDPR until they are amended, 
replaced or repealed.176 
A particular advantage of standard contractual clauses is the fact that 
they involve standardized agreements which can, and may, no longer be 
amended or negotiated. Nor is a separate approval by an authority required. 
Therefore, in practice standard contractual clauses are both popular and 
widespread. However, it is not clear how long that will continue to be the 
case. The judgment of the ECJ in the Schrems177 case, in which it declared 
the previous safe-harbor decision of the European Commission of 2000 to 
be invalid, will most likely also have repercussions on the current standard 
contractual clauses which are presently being examined by the ECJ.178 The 
 
 174. European Commission Decision, supra note 160. 
 175. European Commission Decision of 27 December 2004 amending Decision 
2001/497/EC as regards the introduction of an alternative set of standard contractual clauses 
for the transfer of personal data to third countries, C(2004) 5271, 2004 O.J. L 385/74. 
 176. See Article 46(5) sentence 2 GDPR. 
 177. ECJ Case C-362/14, supra note 106. 
 178. See the Judgment of the Irish High Court of 3 October 2017 to submit standard 
contractual clauses to the ECJ for its review, Judgment 2016 No. 4809 P. (available at 
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/HCJ.pdf). 
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“half-life” of the standard contractual clauses that are still valid at the 
moment is therefore likely to be limited. 
The standard contractual clauses regulate the rights and duties of the 
data exporter (i.e., the EU company) and the data importer (i.e., the U.S. 
company). They also contain provisions regarding the commissioning of 
additional subcontractors and on liability. The parties must describe the 
essential content of the transfer in the annexes to the standard contractual 
clauses (categories of the data transferred, data subjects, purposes of the 
transfer, processing measures, etc.). These are the very few parts of the 
standard contractual clauses which can (and must) be adjusted by the 
contracting parties. 
It should be noted that the contracts that must be entered into in the case 
of a joint controllership within the meaning of Article 26 GDPR or a 
commissioned data processing pursuant to Article 28 GDPR (which was 
discussed above) must be concluded in addition to the standard contractual 
clauses, which can lead to conflicts in priority.179 Another problem that arises 
in the case of a commissioned data processing is that an EU processor is 
obligated under Articles 44 et seq. GDPR to comply with the requirements 
for the permissible transfer of data to third countries.180 However, it must be 
noted in this connection that at present there is no set of standard contractual 
clauses of the European Commission which could be concluded directly 
between an EU processor and a U.S. company. The standard contractual 
clauses of the European Commission which are available to date apply only 
to cases in which an EU company as the controller transfers personal data to 
a processor outside of the EU.181 It is therefore absolutely essential that this 
legal situation be further developed, either by the ECJ or by clarifying 
official statements. 
 
V.  Consequences for U.S. Companies which are  
Subject to the GDPR 
 
If a U.S. company falls under the GDPR, it must comply with the 
provisions therein to the same extent as an EU company which is bound to 
the stipulations of the GDPR. There is no “layered approach” in this 
regard.182 If the company offers goods or services to persons in the European 
Union or monitors their behavior, it must appoint a representative in the 
 
 179. See IV. A. and IV. B. above. 
 180. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 13. 
 181. See European Commission Decision, supra note 160. 
 182. Proposing such an approach: Svantesson, supra note 9, at para. 33. 
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European Union (see A.). With regard to the other duties which are to be 
fulfilled, a distinction must be made as to whether the U.S. company is acting 
as a controller or as a processor within the meaning of the GDPR. 
Independent of that, the U.S. company will then have to comply with a great 
many other duties, breaches of which are subject to fines (see B.). However, 
it must be pointed out that at present it is still completely unclear whether, 
and if so how, a breach of these duties by U.S. companies would be 
prosecuted by European supervisory authorities. 
 
A.  Appointment of a Representative in the EU 
 
In the cases set out in Article 3(2) GDPR, i.e., if U.S. companies offer 
goods or services in the EU or monitor their behavior, the controller or 
processor must designate a representative in the European Union in 
writing.183 However, this does not apply for processing which is occasional, 
does not include, on a large scale, processing of special categories of data as 
referred to in Article 9(1) GDPR or processing of personal data relating to 
criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 10 GDPR, and is 
unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
taking into account the nature, context, scope and purposes of the processing. 
The representative must be established in one of the Member States 
where the data subjects are whose personal data are being processed in 
relation to the offering of goods or services to them, or whose behavior is 
being monitored. The representative must be mandated by the U.S. company 
to be addressed in addition to or instead of the controller or the processor by 
supervisory authorities and data subjects, on all issues related to processing, 
for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the GDPR.  
According to recital 80 of the GDPR, the conception is to make it 
possible for the representative to be addressed by any supervisory authority. 
This is not only meant to facilitate the communication and serving of actions 
or injunctions against the controller or the processor. Article 58(1)(a) GDPR 
provides that in cases of violations of data protection law, the controller, the 
processor “and where applicable”, the controller’s or the processor’s 
representative must also provide information. This is accompanied by recital 
80 of the GDPR, under which the representative can be subject to 
enforcement proceedings. How specifically the implementation of these 
provisions against U.S. companies will be structured will depend decisively 
on the data protection authorities’ intention to enforce them and their ability 
to create a potential to apply pressure, as well as on the willingness of the 
 
 183. See Article 27 GDPR. 
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relevant data processing companies to cooperate with them. Ultimately, 
however, the target of the rules relating to the data protection responsibilities 
will – as recital 80 of the GDPR clarifies – be the controller or processor, i.e. 
in this case the U.S. company,184 which in a great number of cases would not 
be very easy to apprehend. 
 
B.  Further Duties  
 
In order to determine what further duties a U.S. company must comply 
with under the GDPR, a distinction must be made as to whether the U.S. 
company is acting as a “controller” or a “processor” within the meaning of 
the GDPR.185  
A legal definition of the term “controller” is provided in Article 4 No. 7 
GDPR. It covers any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and 
means of the processing. If individual natural persons are acting, it must be 
asked who the actions is to be attributed to – the acting person him or herself 
(who in that case would be the controller) or the organization for which that 
person works (which would then be the controller).186 Any economic links 
or de facto influence which may exist would not play any role in identifying 
the controller. The approach that needs to be taken in this regard is not an 
economic, but rather a legal one. Accordingly, legally independent 
companies are each their own controller, even if they are affiliated with each 
other in a group. It follows from the definition of “controller” that the 
possibility of a joint controllership exists, the prerequisites for which are 
explained in more detail in Article 26 GDPR (see IV. B. above).  
Another important actor within the framework of the GDPR is the 
processor.187 Pursuant to Article 4 No. 8 GDPR, a processor is any natural or 
legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller. Typical cases of processing are, for 
example, file destruction, support by computer centers, offers of Software as 
 
 184. European Data Protection Board, supra note 19, at 27. 
 185. For more on the term “controller,” see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
supra note 161; see also David Powell & Kevin Walsh, Chaotic Rollout for European Data 
Privacy Regulations Raises Questions for Benefit Plan Administrators, Benefits Brief (14 
June 2018), (available at https://www.groom.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Chaotic-
Rollout-for-European-Data-Privacy-Regulations-Raises-Questions-for-Benefit-Plan-Admini 
strators.pdf.); see also Houser & Voss, supra note 87, at 67. 
 186. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 161, at 16. 
 187.   Powell & Walsh, supra note 185. 
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a Service (SaaS), cloud services, etc.188 Processing is not carried out in the 
case of, for example, the engagement of attorneys or the preparation of tax 
declarations by tax advisors. The processor must render services for the 
controller on the basis of a contract pursuant to Article 28 GDPR. In relation 
to the controller, the processor more or less functions as a “data slave” or a 
“puppet”.189 If the processor steps out of the framework prescribed for it, 
however, then it will be deemed to be a controller pursuant to Article 28(10) 
GDPR – with the consequence that it will be subject to all of the duties 
incumbent on controllers.  
If U.S. companies are subject to the GDPR, then depending on whether 
they fall under the category of a controller or a processor they must comply 
with a great many duties.190 These are described in the following. 
 
1.  Ascertaining the Lawfulness of the Processing 
 
If the U.S. company is to be considered a controller, it will first and 
foremost be held responsible for the lawfulness of the processing. The central 
rule in European data protection law in this sense would then be that the 
processing of personal data is generally prohibited.191 It may occur only if 
either the data subjects consent to it or another statutory criterion for 
permissibility applies, in particular from the definitive list in the general 
clauses of Articles 6 and 9 GDPR, but also under national law insofar as the 
GDPR explicitly grants this possibility through the various opening 
clauses.192  
This “prohibition with reservation of permission”, which every 
controller has to comply with, specifies the statutory reservation on the 
national level for the public sphere as a general principle of EU law,193 which 
must always be complied with in cases of interference with fundamental 
rights. Conversely, in the non-public sphere, this prohibition with reservation 
of permission restricts the fundamental rights of the controller. Each 
individual phase of the data processing requires legitimation, and thus a data 
 
 188. See also the examples given in IV. A. above. 
 189. For more on the term “processor,” see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
supra note 161. 
 190. See also the overview in Abraham & Loveday, supra note 96, at 12; Houser & Voss, 
supra note 87, at 71. 
 191. See Houser & Voss, supra note 87, at 75. 
 192. See III. above in this regard. 
 193. ECJ Case 46/87, Hoechst AG v Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, at para. 19, 
(available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=95199&pageIndex=0& 
doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1000316). 
1 - KLAR_HSTLJ11-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2020  8:15 AM 
Summer 2020] GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 145 
subject’s consent which merely covers the collection and storage is not 
sufficient for the transfer of data. It must therefore always be carefully 
examined whether each intended use of personal data in every phase can be 
supported by a criterion for permissibility. If this is not possible, then it will 
be necessary to refrain from processing the personal data involved. 
Moreover, the overarching necessity principle applies along with the 
prohibition with reservation of permission, as is made particularly clear with 
the criteria for permissibility set out in Article 6(1) sent. 1 lit. b-f GDPR, 
under which the processing of personal data is permissible only if this is 
necessary within the scope of the respective criterion for permissibility, i.e. 
if no sensible or reasonable alternative exists to the manner of data 
processing that is being contemplated in order to achieve the desired 
objective.194 
 
2.  Information Requirements 
 
Furthermore, the GDPR provides for comprehensive information 
requirements for controllers.195 In the view of the legislature, in order for 
data subjects to be able to avail themselves of possible options for action, it 
is necessary that they know in the first place that the controller is processing 
personal data relating to them. Proceeding from this transparency concept 
which is enshrined in the transparency principle of Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, 
the regulators have created comprehensive information requirements for the 
controller.  
With regard to the information to be provided to the data subjects, a 
distinction must be made as to whether the data are collected from the data 
subject, and thus they themselves are functioning as direct data sources (in 
which case Article 13 GDPR is to be applied), or if the data are collected not 
from the data subjects themselves, but from, for example, third parties or 
publicly accessible sources (in which case Article 14 GDPR applies). As a 
rule, the controller is obligated to provide the data subject with information 
such as its identity and contact details, the contact details of a data protection 
officer, where applicable, the purposes of the processing for which the 
personal data are intended, the legal basis for the processing, and the 
recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data. Generally, this 
information must also state the period for which the data will be stored and 
 
 194. Kühling & Klar & Sackmann, supra note 128, at 141. 
 195. Extensively discussed in Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on 
transparency under Regulation 2016/679, WP 260 rev.01 (2018). 
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explain the rights to oppose the processing to which the data subject is 
entitled. 
How the controller fulfills this duty in practice will depend on the 
situation at hand. If data processing on websites is involved, the data subjects 
will normally be informed by way of a privacy policy. If contracts are 
concluded, the information may be conveyed in a separate data protection 
information if appropriate. 
 
3.  Other Obligations vis-à-vis Data Subjects 
 
Articles 15 et seq. of the GDPR set out additional specific data 
protection rights benefitting data subjects which U.S. companies must 
comply with if they are subject to the GDPR as controllers.  
For example, in the view of the European lawmakers it is of essential 
importance for data subjects to be able to learn by obtaining access to 
information whether the controller is processing any personal data 
concerning them, and if so, what personal data is involved. In fact, Article 
8(2) sent. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU)196 directly gives rise to the right to be informed: “Everyone has the 
right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and 
the right to have it rectified.” Against this background, the right of access 
upon request pursuant to Article 15 GDPR which, moreover, is also 
enshrined in the transparency principle of Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, is of 
particular importance. The data subject has the right to obtain information in 
particular on whether personal data are being processed by the controller and 
if that is the case, information on the purposes of the processing, the 
categories of personal data which are being processed and the recipients or 
categories of recipients of the data. In fact, the data subject must be provided 
with a copy of his or her personal data, provided that this does not adversely 
affect the rights of any third parties. In practice, fulfilling this right to 
information can result in a great expenditure of time and money. It is 
presumably also for this reason that it has become “fashionable” in practice 
to assert it in situations in which, for example, an employee would like to 
drive up his or her severance payment. 
Article 16 sent. 1 GDPR provides the data subject with the right to 
obtain from the controller the rectification of inaccurate personal data 
concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, 
the data subject also has the right to have incomplete personal data completed 
(Article 16 sent. 2 GDPR). The right to rectification upon request 
 
 196. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/1. 
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supplements the principle of data accuracy pursuant to Article 5(1)(d) 
GDPR, which obligates the controller to ensure data accuracy even if no 
request is made. On a primary level of EU law, the right to rectification is 
established in Article 8(2) sent. 2 CFREU: “Everyone has the right of access 
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have 
it rectified.” 
Pursuant to Article 17(1) GDPR, subject to certain conditions, the data 
subject additionally has the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of 
personal data concerning him or her without undue delay. This right is in line 
with the controller’s corresponding duty to erase which, in a general form, 
already derives from the principle of storage limitation pursuant to Article 
5(1)(e) GDPR. Paragraph 1 of Article 17 GDPR is structured as a classical 
right to erasure, which is supplemented in paragraph 2 with special 
information requirements (in the sense of the right to be forgotten).197 The 
obligation to erase generally applies in the cases mentioned in Article 17(1) 
GDPR independently of a request by the data subjects.198 This means as a 
rule that companies have to define erasure dates for their various processing 
activities and record them in an archiving and erasure concept. 
Subject to certain conditions, a data subject has the right under Article 
18 GDPR to demand that the controller restrict the processing of personal 
data concerning him or her. What is meant here is the blocking of personal 
data. This term is described in Article 4 No. 3 GDPR as the marking of stored 
personal data with the aim of limiting their processing in the future. As a 
rule, this restriction serves to achieve a (temporary) balance between the data 
subject’s interest in protection and the controller’s interest in processing the 
data.199 
Article 20 GDPR grants the data subject a right against the controller to 
data portability upon request.200 This right, which provides data subjects with 
a comprehensive power to dispose of “their” data, was newly created in the 
 
 197. For a criticism of the term, see Houser & Voss, supra note 87, at 72. 
 198. Kühling & Klar & Sackmann, supra note 128, at 250. 
 199. In general, on the right to be forgotten in the Internet, Meg Leta Ambrose, A Digital 
Dark Age and the Right to Be Forgotten, 17 J. INTERNET L. 8, 9 (2013); Bennett, supra note 
97, at 167; Ryan Budish, In The Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy 
Law, HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1874 (2007); Francoise Gilbert, The Right of Erasure or Right to 
Be Forgotten: What the Recent Laws, Cases, and Guidelines Mean for Global Companies, 18 
J. INTERNET L. 14, 15 (2015); Benjamin J. Keele, Privacy by Deletion: The Need for a Global 
Data Deletion Principle, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 363, 375 (2009); Emily Adams 
Shoor, Narrowing the Right to be Forgotten: Why the European Union Needs to Amend the 
Proposed Data Protection Regulation, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 487, 517 (2014); Mark Tunick, 
Privacy and Punishment, 39 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 643, 667 (2013).  
 200. See also Houser & Voss, supra note 87, at 74. 
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GDPR. There was no model for it in European law up to that point. It is 
closely related to the right of access, but differs from it in many ways.201 The 
right to data portability – like the right to information – is meant to ensure 
that the data subject can further strengthen the control over his or her own 
data (see recital 68 of the GDPR202). At the same time, it should be possible 
and as uncomplicated as possible for a data subject to switch from one 
controller to a different one,203 which may provide more data protection-
friendly systems. In this respect, the provision is also pursuing competition 
policy objectives. At the same time, it contributes to the development and 
use of interoperable formats. Furthermore, the right to data portability will 
reduce any “lock-in effects” (with antitrust implications) which may exist,204 
and could particularly play a role with regard to internet service providers. 
Accordingly, the discussion on creating a right to data portability focused 
primarily on social networks. But the provision is also applicable beyond 
that, for example in connection with music streaming services, webmail 
applications,205 banks or insurances. In its content, the right to data 
portability covers both the data subjects’ right to obtain all or part of the 
personal data concerning them which they had provided to the controller206 
and to have the controller transfer these data to another controller.207 
However, the other controller is not obligated to take receipt of the data. The 
data subject may also directly demand that the controller transmit the 
relevant personal data to another controller, where technically feasible.208 
The transmission to the second controller should then be carried out “without 
hindrance” from the first controller under the provision. Hence, any technical 
or legal hindrance, as well as any delay in execution, must be avoided. In 
 
 201. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the right to data portability, 
WP 242 rev.01, 3 (2017). 
 202. Recital 68 of the GDPR: “To further strengthen the control over his or her own data, 
where the processing of personal data is carried out by automated means, the data subject 
should also be allowed to receive personal data concerning him or her which he or she has 
provided to a controller in a structured, commonly used, machine-readable and interoperable 
format, and to transmit it to another controller.” 
 203. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 201, at 3. 
 204. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 201, at 5. 
 205. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 201, at 5. 
 206. On the right to data portability in the case of complex data structures, see Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, supra note 201, at 18. 
 207. Article 20(1) GDPR. 
 208. Article 20(2) GDPR. 
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this respect, when transmitting the data, the controller is acting on behalf of 
the data subject.209 
Pursuant to Article 21 GDPR, in certain situations the data subject has 
the right to object to the processing of personal data affecting him or her by 
a controller, thus ensuring that the controller will no longer be allowed to 
process the data involved. The provision defines various situations in which 
the data subject can object to the processing. What they all have in common 
is that the right to object is directed at processing which is lawful in and of 
itself but is not in line with the intention of the data subject. The right to 
object under Article 21 GDPR is not to be confused with a data subject’s 
right to withdraw his or her consent under Article 7(3) sent. 1 GDPR, which 
pertains to a consent that had been given by the data subject. 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 77 GDPR, the data subject is free to lodge 
a complaint with a supervisory authority if he or she considers that the 
processing of the personal data relating to him or her infringes the GDPR. 
Additionally, the data subject has the right to a judicial remedy against a 
supervisory authority in accordance with Article 78 GDPR or against the 
controller or processor pursuant to Article 79 GDPR. Finally, Article 82(1) 
GDPR regulates compensation claims against the controller or the processor 
due to infringements of the GDPR, as a result of which the data subject 
suffered material or non-material damage.  
 
4.  Designation of a Data Protection Officer 
 
Subject to the prerequisites set out in Article 37 GDPR, U.S. companies 
must designate an (internal or external) data protection officer.210 The 
requirements placed on the duty to designate a data privacy officer are 
regulated in Article 37 GDPR.211 Consequently, U.S. companies within the 
scope of the GDPR will have to designate a data protection officer if their 
core activities, i.e., the most important work processes which are necessary 
to achieve their objectives, consist of processing operations which, by virtue 
of their nature, their scope and/or their purposes, require regular and 
systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale212 or their core 
 
 209. On the responsibility in these cases, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
supra note 201, at 6. 
 210. See also Houser & Voss, supra note 87, at 77. 
 211. See also the more detailed explanations in Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (‘DPOs’), WP 243 rev.01 (2017). 
 212. See Article 37(1)(b) GDPR. 
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activities consist of processing on a large scale of special categories of data 
(concerning health, genetic data, etc.).213 
If a data protection officer is to be designated, his or her main task is to 
work to ensure that the controller complies with the legal data protection 
rules and to inform and advise it with regard to data protection issues.214 He 
or she must further cooperate with the data protection supervisory authority 
for which he or she is the central contact point at the controller or 
processor.215 Data subjects may also contact the data protection officer, who 
must assist and advise them.216 
 
5.  Documentation Duties  
 
One substantive change to the GDPR is the far more stringent 
documentation duties which can definitely create a burden for companies in 
practice. Of central importance in this regard is the provision in Article 5(2) 
GDPR that the controller is not only responsible for the lawfulness of the 
data processing, but must consistently be able to demonstrate it 
(accountability). In practice, this can only be achieved by way of complete 
documentation. This requirement serves several functions; the duty to 
provide documentation has a reflexive effect on the controller itself, which 
should take this occasion to become aware of the extent of its processing 
activities and their lawfulness. For this reason, a violation of the 
documentation duties themselves is subject to a fine.217 It is therefore a 
function of self-monitoring which is similar to the warning function of a 
formal requirement under civil law. Moreover, well-managed documentation 
facilitates the fulfillment of requests for information by the supervisory 
authorities. Last, but not least, this also reverses the burden of proof, putting 
the data subject who seeks to take action against unlawful data processing in 
a stronger position.  
Specifically, the GDPR in particular provides for general accountability 
under Article 5(2) GDPR in conjunction with Article 24(1) GDPR, as well 
as a duty to maintain a record of processing activities (“processing record”) 
pursuant to Article 30 GDPR.218 A violation of this duty is subject to a fine. 
 
 213. See Article 37(1)(c) GDPR. 
 214. See Article 39(1)(a) GDPR. 
 215. Article 39(1)(d) and (e) GDPR. 
 216. Article 38(4) GDPR. 
 217. Article 83(4)(a) GDPR. 
 218. Article 5(2) GDPR: “The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to 
demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’).” Article 24(1) GDPR: “Taking 
into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of 
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The processing record must contain the information listed in Article 30(1) 
GDPR, such as the name and the contact details of the controller, the purpose 
of the processing, a description of the categories of data subjects, etc. 
Processors must also maintain a record with a similar content.219  
 
6.  Notification Duties 
 
Controllers are additionally obliged to notify data protection breaches 
to the competent supervisory authority without undue delay.220 In the case of 
U.S. companies who offer goods or services to persons in the European 
Union or monitor their behavior, several data protection authorities in the 
European Union may have parallel competence in this regard.221 Data 
protection breaches are legally defined in Article 4 No. 12 GDPR as a breach 
of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, 
unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or 
otherwise processed. Thus, this is directed at the classical “data protection 
failures,” which are often caused by IT security defects. The purpose of the 
notification duty is so that the supervisory authorities can be involved early 
on and assist the controller in handling the problem. However, a notification 
is not necessary if the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to 
the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The controller must assess this 
question on its own responsibility in a predictive decision taking into 
consideration the severity of the possible consequences and the likelihood 
that they will occur.222 The notification must be drawn up by the controller. 
If a processor becomes aware of a data protection breach, it must inform the 
controller thereof without undue delay.223 Such a duty also derives from the 
mandatory commissioned data processing agreement.224 
The controller must submit the notification without undue delay and, 
where feasible, no later than 72 hours after having become aware of it. The 
 
varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller 
shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure and to be able to 
demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with this Regulation. Those measures 
shall be reviewed and updated where necessary.” 
 219. See Article 30(2) GDPR. 
 220. See Article 33 GDPR. For more information, see Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Guidelines on Personal data breach notification under Regulation 2016/679, WP 250 
rev.01 (2018). 
 221. See recital 122 sentence 2 of the GDPR. 
 222. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 220, at 8. 
 223. Article 33(2) GDPR. 
 224. See Article 28(3) sent. 2 lit. f GDPR. 
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controller must in particular describe the nature of the breach, including 
where possible the categories and approximate number of persons concerned 
and the categories and approximate number of personal data records 
concerned, as well as the likely consequences of the personal data breach and 
the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller.225 This is to 
enable the supervisory authority to quickly obtain an overview of the extent 
and consult on its response.  
In the event of a personal data breach, the controller must not only 
inform the supervisory authority, but also, under certain circumstances, the 
data subjects as well (Article 34 GDPR). This is necessary if the breach is 
likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. 
The system involved is the reverse of that for the duty to notify the 
supervisory authority: the communication is not necessary as a rule, but only 
in exceptional cases if the breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights 
and freedoms of natural persons. However, the communication will not be 
required if, for example, the relevant data are protected by technical and 
organizational protection measures (such as effective encryption),226 due to 
countermeasures taken by the controller, the high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of data subjects is no longer likely to materialize227 or the 
communication would involve disproportionate effort to carry out.228 In the 
latter case, individual communications would be replaced by a public 
communication or similar measure in a form which will make it possible for 
the data subjects to obtain knowledge of the breach. This could be 
accomplished primarily through daily newspapers or publications on the 
internet. If the controller fails to comply with this duty it can also be ordered 
to do so by a supervisory authority.229 Moreover, a breach of the duty to 
communicate is subject to a fine.230 
 
7.  Data Protection Impact Assessment 
 
Under Article 35 GDPR, it is mandatory for certain processing 
operations that the controller carry out a data protection impact assessment. 
The purpose of this is for the controller in particularly sensitive areas to be 
 
 225. Article 33(3) GDPR. 
 226. Article 34(3)(a) GDPR. 
 227. See Article 34(3)(b) GDPR. 
 228. Article 34(3)(c) GDPR. 
 229. See Article 34(4) GDPR. 
 230. Article 83(4)(a) GDPR. 
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aware of the possible consequences of the data processing operations by 
means of a structured procedure.231 
According to the statutory provisions, a data protection impact 
assessment must always be carried out where the type of processing, in 
particular using new technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, 
context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the 
rights and freedoms of natural persons.232 In that case, the controller must 
first assess the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the 
protection of personal data. The GDPR provides some examples of when a 
data protection impact assessment must be carried out.233 For example, a data 
protection impact assessment is required in the case of a systematic and 
extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is 
based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions 
are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or 
similarly significantly affect the natural person.234 A data protection impact 
assessment is also required in the case of processing on a large scale of 
special categories of data or of personal data relating to criminal convictions 
and offences.235 Moreover, a data protection impact assessment is required 
in the case of a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large 
scale.236 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party formulated additional 
scenarios in its Working Paper 248 in which a data protection impact 
assessment would be necessary.237 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
With the help of an expanded territorial scope of the European data 
protection law, the European legislature is striving to protect the privacy 
rights of data subjects in the European Union comprehensively and 
worldwide. Since American privacy concepts clearly differ from the 
understanding traditionally found in Europe,238 the extraterritorial effect of 
 
 231. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact 
Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” 
for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248 rev.01 (2017). 
 232. Article 35(1) GDPR. 
 233. See Article 35(3) GDPR. 
 234. Article 35(3)(a) GDPR. 
 235. See Article 35(3)(b) GDPR. 
 236. Article 35(3)(c) GDPR. 
 237. For more on this, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 231. 
 238. See Klar & Kühling, supra note, at 98; Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, 
Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115 (2017). 
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the GDPR is likely to have an explosive impact on the relationship between 
these U.S. and European approaches to privacy. The offering of U.S. 
products and services in Europe is caught up in one blow and legally fed into 
the regulation by European institutions. In view of the broad (territorial) 
scope of the GDPR and its enhanced clout as a harmonizing regulation, 
European data protection law will once again gain more influence on the 
general data protection conditions of worldwide trade.239 This effect is 
strengthened by the fact that even if the provisions of the GDPR are not 
directly applicable for U.S. companies, they are often contractually obliged 
by their European partners to comply with a data protection standard similar 
to that of the GDPR. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that U.S. 
companies which are bound by the rules of the GDPR also have to comply 
at the same time with the national data protection requirements under U.S. 
law, as well as possibly those of other jurisdictions. This fact should be taken 
into account with an appropriately restrictive interpretation of the scope of 
the GDPR and its requirements imposed on data controllers outside the EU.  
In the US, the strong influence exerted by California’s comparatively 
high data protection standards on the other states is known as the “California 
effect.”240 With regard to the GDPR, it is becoming apparent that the 
extraterritorial approach of European data protection is leading to a “Brussels 
effect” worldwide.241 Given the expansion of the scope of European data 
protection law, U.S. companies should at least obtain an overview of the new 
provisions and ascertain whether or not the GDPR is applicable to them. It 
would also make sense to delve more deeply into this issue, since it can be 
assumed that more states will be sharpening up their data protection rules or 
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